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ABSTRACT
This Article provides a new perspective on the image of marriage that
has emerged from the same-sex marriage debate. However flawed, the
procreation rationale has enjoyed overwhelming success in recent samesex marriage litigation. However absurd, the idea that same-sex
marriage is a species of counterfeit has become so commonplace in the
rhetoric surrounding same-sex marriage that it nearly escapes our notice.
This Article argues that while neither the procreation rationale nor
contemporary counterfeiting rhetoric makes much sense when
considered in isolation, both make a great deal of sense when considered
in concert. To that end, this Article looks at the historical casting of
non-normative intimate relationships and reproductive practices
(sodomy and miscegenation) in subversive economic terms (counterfeit)
in order to explain the highly influential procreation rationale for samesex marriage prohibitions. It ultimately suggests that the image of
same-sex marriage (and same-sex reproduction) as a fraud that has
emerged from the same-sex marriage debate, and from recent same-sex
marriage litigation, brings us back full circle to sodomy and links up
with the imagery of disgust that once surrounded sodomy regulation and
the legal treatment of sexual orientation minorities through Lawrence v.
Texas. It also suggests that the law’s procreationist vision of marriage
might be viewed as at once hopelessly restrictive and daringly
liberating.
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INTRODUCTION
From the metaphor of the closet3 to that of the three dollar bill,
tropes4 of fraud, deception, and mimicry seem to trip off the tongue
when the subject of a queer sexual orientation arises.5 Over the last
decade, and particularly within the last three years, marriage
traditionalists have increasingly relied on a particular rhetoric of
deception—that of counterfeiting—to convey what in their view is a
species of public fraud: same-sex marriage and its close approximations,
civil unions and domestic partnerships. Counterfeiting rhetoric has
become so common, in fact, in the legal controversy over same-sex
marriage that its sheer pervasiveness nearly renders it invisible.
In May 2003, Marilyn Musgrave, United States Representative
and co-sponsor of the original Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA),
publicly declared that a federal marriage amendment was necessary
because “[t]he traditional values Americans hold are being traded in for
counterfeit marital unions.”6 Representative Musgrave was not the first
person involved in the same-sex marriage debate to coin the analogy
between same-sex marriage and counterfeiting. Rather, its vintage in
that debate may be traced at least as far back as the mid-90s, when
Robert Knight, Director of the Concerned Women of America’s Culture
and Family Institute, deployed the counterfeiting trope to describe samesex marriage7 and when Gary Bauer, former President of the Family
3

For the metaphor of the closet as applied to sexual orientation minorities among other groups,
see EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect
Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753,
1793-1816 (1996).
4
A “trope” denotes the “turning” of a word away from its original meaning toward a new
meaning that is not immediately obvious. See infra note _____, and accompanying text. The
idea of “queer as counterfeit” is one such trope that this Article discusses.
5
The category of “queer” is by no means self-defining. This Article will demonstrate that
“queer” at once connotes passing and deception (e.g., queer/counterfeit currency) and a resolute
refusal to pass and to deceive (e.g., queer as ostentation). In this sense, “queer” connotations
partake of the same double bind in which the law routinely places sexual orientation minorities:
simultaneously passing too much and not enough. For the latter sense of queer, see Kenji
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L. J. 769, 839 (2002). For some queer theorists, the “semantic
clout” and “political efficacy” of the very category of queer follow from its “resistance to
definition.” ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (1996).
6
Cheryl Wetzstein, Bill To Define Marriage Tried Again in House as Two States Mull Cases,
WASH. TIMES (May 26, 2003).
7
David W. Dunlap, Some States Trying To Stop Gay Marriages Before They Start, N.Y. TIMES,
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Research Council, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, in
favor of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), that same-sex
marriage is “a counterfeit that will do great harm to the special status
that the genuine institution [of marriage] has earned.”8 Nor, indeed,
would Representative Musgrave be the last to link subversive
numismatic practices with non-normative sexual and affective
relationships. More recently, counterfeiting has become a routine way
to describe same-sex marriage and its imitative approximations, civil
unions and domestic partnerships, as well as the ‘artificial’ reproduction
that occurs in the context of a same-sex relationship.9
Where does this counterfeiting language come from and what
does it signify? More important, what work is it doing in the legal
controversy over the extension of marital rights to same-sex couples?
On one level, to compare same-sex marriage to a counterfeit makes
sense in light of the fact that sexual orientation minorities and
counterfeit articles share a common language. The federal criminal
statute that targets counterfeiting, 18 U.S.C.A. § 472,10 imposes
penalties on those who either “pass” or attempt to “pass” counterfeit
currency in the United States. With respect to sexual orientation
minorities, Professor Kenji Yoshino has amply documented just how
pervasive the language and ideology of “passing” is for gays and
lesbians.11 Below, I will return to this idea that same-sex couples are
like counterfeit because artificial reproductive technology is increasingly
allowing them to pass for straight—part of the reason, I submit, why
procreation has suddenly become the dominant rationale in same-sex
marriage litigation today.
At the same time, however, to compare same-sex marriage to a
counterfeit makes about as much sense as does the claim that same-sex
marriage will lead us ineluctably down the slippery slope to incest. In a
prior article, I argued that the slippery slope trope, “from same-sex
marriage to incest,” does not hold up because incest is definitionally
imprecise—just where is it that we are slipping to when we slip into
1995 WL 3812247 (Mar. 15, 1995) (remarks of Robert Knight).
8
U.S. CONG. TEST., 1996 WL 387291 (F.D.C.H.) (July 11, 1996) (testimony of Gary L. Bauer).
9
See infra Part II, passim.
10
18 U.S.C.A. § 472 (2001).
11
Yoshino, supra note 4, at 814-36 (documenting the cultural and legal contexts in which
passing norms occur).
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incest12—and because in many ways we have already slipped.13 Here, I
turn instead to the counterfeiting trope that legal actors, among others,
have recently deployed to describe the public fraud that, in their view,
same-sex marriage represents. Like the slippery slope to incest trope,
the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex marriage does not hold up
because, quite simply, same-sex marriage is not duping the public and
same-sex couples are not, at least technically, passing for straight when
they marry each other. Rather, that relationship is, for many, more akin
to the obscene: “I know it when I see it.”14 As with the imprecision
surrounding the incest trope, the descriptive inaccuracy of recent
counterfeiting rhetoric invites us to question just what is fueling that
rhetoric—and, more important, the laws that have flowed from it.
This Article argues that the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex
relations, while on its face illogical, is intimately tied to concerns about
sodomy and same-sex procreation. It will show that the counterfeiting
analogy that has emerged in the legal discourse surrounding rights for
gays and lesbians—explicitly in the policy rhetoric and implicitly in
case law since as early as Romer v. Evans,15 where an image of the
‘homosexual-as-counterfeiter’ surfaces in Justice Scalia’s dissent—not
only makes a great deal of sense on its own, but also helps to make
sense of the current legal treatment of same-sex couples in the marriage
context. Early-modern historical and literary sources reveal that the
counterfeiting analogy has a lineage that antecedes its more recent
appearance in the same-sex marriage debate. As with the current
casting of same-sex relationships as counterfeit, the counterfeiting
analogy was once deployed to signify non-procreative sex (sodomy) and
‘dangerous’ procreation (miscegenation). A look at that history is
useful, and necessary, for two reasons. First, it provides a lens through
which to view, and better understand, the claim that “same-sex marriage
is a counterfeit”—a statement which on its own fails to explain how a
relationship that is regularly characterized as a form of flaunting has
suddenly become a deception perpetrated on the public. Second, and
12

Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of
Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99
NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 1543, 1562 (2005).
13
See id. at 1566.
14
Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
15
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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more important, it helps to explain the highly influential, and hugely
successful, procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions. In
short, the counterfeiting analogy, and the ample history behind it,
clarifies just why procreation is the dominant concern in same-sex
marriage litigation today.16
Until recently, it had appeared that the procreation rationale—the
argument that same-sex couples cannot legally marry because they
cannot sexually procreate with each other—was in desuetude, no longer
“advanced seriously by states or taken seriously by courts.”17 Even just
a brief glance at the state reporters, however, reveals that the procreation
rationale—or at least a version of it—is very much alive. In early July,
the New York Court of Appeals upheld that state’s same-sex marriage
prohibition on the basis of procreation;18 in late July, the Supreme Court
of Washington did the same.19 Both courts were merely following in the
footsteps of courts in other states that have similarly held that
procreation is a constitutionally relevant factor when determining who
may, and who may not, legally marry.20 To be sure, the current version
of the procreation rationale has a kinder, gentler face than that of its
predecessor—a transformation that I discuss below. Nevertheless, the
crux of the argument is still the same: because same-sex couples cannot
sexually produce offspring with each other, same-sex marriage
prohibitions are constitutional.
The recent resurgence of the procreation rationale has stumped
commentators and (some) judges alike, both of whom have dismissed it
as absurd and reminiscent of the same animus that the Court in Romer
held was an impermissible basis for laws under even rational basis
review.21 They have queried: What does the procreation rationale mean
16
See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 7 FLA. COAST. L. REV. 181,
193 (2005) (“The procreation argument enjoys great currency in academic and legal discussions
of gay marriage. Indeed, it is probably the most common argument against gay marriage in these
circles”); William C. Duncan, The State Interests in Marriage, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 153, 154
(2004) (same).
17
Peter Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of “Public Morality”
Qualify as Legitimate Governmental Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87
GEO. L.J. 139, 151 (1998).
18
See Hernandez v. Robles, 2006 WL 1835429, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 05239 (N.Y. Jul 6, 2006).
19
See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
20
See infra notes ______, and accompanying text.
21
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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for cross-sex couples who cannot, or do not want to, sexually
reproduce?22 How does it affect adopted children and their adoptive
families?23 Given its emphasis on biological anatomy, doesn’t it hew
perilously close to gender discrimination?24 This Article argues that
these criticisms are missing what the procreation rationale is really all
about: the prevention of fraud. It proposes that the success of that
rationale in recent same-sex marriage litigation is better understood in
light of the counterfeiting rhetoric that has also emerged—alongside the
procreation rationale, it turns out—from the recent same-sex marriage
debate. While neither the counterfeiting analogy nor the procreation
rationale makes much, if any, sense when viewed in isolation, they both
begin to make a lot more sense when viewed as a unit. Specifically, the
historic association between counterfeiting and sodomy, and
counterfeiting and miscegenation, clarifies what is fraudulent about
same-sex marriage: the apparent legitimacy, or “counterfeit equality,”25
that it would confer on intra-relationally non-procreative couples who
could then “pass”—like a counterfeit coin (or a mixed-race
individual)—for the so-called ‘real’ thing. Considered in this light, the
procreation rationale begins to make more sense. Whereas procreation
alone might not be a rational basis by which to sustain a same-sex
marriage prohibition, the prevention of fraud surely is.
This Article will proceed as follows. The first two Parts analyze
the procreation rationale and counterfeiting rhetoric, respectively, in
order to set the stage for Part III and Part IV’s more substantive analysis
of the relationship between them. Part I summarizes the evolution of
the procreation rationale that states have offered in support of same-sex
marriage prohibitions. In addition, it maintains that pre-existing
criticism of that rationale by jurists and commentators fails to consider
the extent to which the procreation justification reflects a belief that
same-sex marriage, and same-sex procreation, are a species of fraud.
Part II then provides an overview of the counterfeiting trope that has
22

See infra notes ______, and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children From the Marriage Movement: The Case
Against Marital Status Discrimination and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305
(2006).
24
See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Too Good For Marriage, NEW YORK TIMES (July 14, 2006).
25
See infra note ______ (remarks of Professor Douglas Kmiec).
23
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been deployed by marriage traditionalists to describe civil unions and
same-sex marriage, and exposes the logical inconsistencies of that trope
as applied to both.
Parts III and IV contend that while neither the counterfeiting
trope nor the procreation rationale makes much sense when considered
separately, they both begin to make a great deal of sense when
considered together. Here, I argue that counterfeiting is a single analogy
that reflects the two procreative concerns that are currently shoring up
same-sex marriage prohibitions: to wit, a fear of fraudulent (nonprocreative) sex and fraudulent families that pass for the real thing. In
order to better understand the counterfeiting analogy—as well as how
sodomy and the families of same-sex partners can properly be thought
of as fraudulent—Part III explores in greater detail the historical linking
of
subversive
sexual/reproductive
relationships
(sodomy,
miscegenation) and counterfeiting in legal and non-legal sources. Part
IV is both narrow and broad in scope. First, and more narrowly, it uses
the history surveyed in Part III to explain the role that procreation is
playing in the same-sex marriage debate today. Second, and more
broadly, it uses that history to tell a much larger story about sex fraud.
The history behind the counterfeiting trope clarifies what is truly
problematic about same-sex marriage and same-sex procreation—the
fraud which the academic commentary has overlooked. It also shows
that the current framing of same-sex marriage as a counterfeit represents
but a single iteration in a much larger, and much longer, story about
‘homosexual’ fraud. This Part will show how in some very real sense
recent same-sex marriage litigation is repeating the history of sodomy
regulation—it’s just that the swindler has replaced the sodomite as the
explicit focal point of concern and disgust for private acts is being
channeled as outrage over public fraud—a rhetorical transformation
from disgust (over private acts) to outrage (over public fraud) that, in
turn, attempts to render discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
legally defensible after Lawrence v. Texas. History shows us, however,
just how much swindlers and sodomites have in common and just how
much the procreation rationale is about sodomy—or, more accurately,
sodomites.
Part V, which is more normative in scope, maintains that we
might view the counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale as at
once restrictive and liberating. On the one hand, both continue to place
8

sexual orientation minorities in the proverbial double bind that has
characterized the law’s treatment of that class since even before Bowers
v. Hardwick,26 where the Supreme Court, as Janet Halley observes,
rhetorically duplicates the double bind in a way that ultimately places
same-sex ‘sodomites’ in a double bind.27 Whereas the law routinely
faults gays and lesbians for not covering (or passing) enough, the
counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale curiously fault those
same individuals for covering (or passing) too much—and, in the
process, for perpetrating a fraud upon the public. On the other hand,
however, both the counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale
provide an opportunity to reassess the central role that the state plays in
creating and maintaining the value of cross-sex marriage as an original
form, and to explore the productive possibilities of imitative
performance more generally. As several notable queer and other
postmodern theorists have shown, imitation of an allegedly original
form—be it gender or marriage—has the power to throw the ontological
primacy of that form into question.28
This Article begins by asking a few relatively simple questions.
First, why have same-sex couples been accused of committing a fraud
when the relationship in question, same-sex marriage, is open, obvious,
and so often characterized as a form of flaunting? Second, why have
courts upheld same-sex marriage prohibitions on the basis of a rationale
as wispy and weightless as procreation? Understanding the history and
theory behind the rhetorical linking of sexual relationships and
subversive economic practices helps to clarify not only how same-sex
marriage is like counterfeiting, but also what is doing some of the work
to shore up the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions.
However, simply because the counterfeiting analogy might make sense
in theory, does not mean that it is immune from criticism.
Counterfeiting rhetoric is not only descriptively inaccurate, but also
perpetuates the vicious double bind which sexual orientation minorities
know only too well. While same-sex marriage proponents might put the
analogy to positive use by exploring the productive possibilities of
imitation, they should at the same time remain wary of a comparison
26

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1748 (1993).
28
See infra Part V.B, passim.
27
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that perpetuates the same double bind that supports discriminatory
treatment under the law.
I.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE PROCREATION
RATIONALE: A HISTORY AND CRITIQUE

In 1998, Peter Cicchino remarked that “[t]he argument from
procreation, that same-sex relationships will bring about the decline of
the nation through underpopulation, no longer seems to be either
advanced seriously by states or taken seriously by courts.”29 However, a
survey of state and federal cases that have recently addressed the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage prohibitions reveals that the
procreation rationale for those prohibitions is in the ascendant—and,
indeed, doing most of the work to insulate them from successful
constitutional attack.
The ongoing success of the procreation rationale requires a close
examination of what is driving that rationale as well as of the
fundamental assumptions on which it rests. Section A summarizes the
trajectory of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage
prohibitions through its most recent appearance in a series of cases
involving state and federal constitutional challenges to those
prohibitions. Section B then discusses the major criticisms of that
rationale offered by legal commentators and by some courts in order to
highlight a point that they have missed and that Parts III and IV will
more fully develop, namely, that the procreation justification is really all
about the prevention of fraud.
A.
1.

The Evolution of the Procreation Rationale: From Sterile
Non-Procreators to Superior Procreators
Procreation Rationale: “Preservation-ThroughTransformation”30
The evolution of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage

29

Cicchino, supra note _____, at 151.
Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117, 2119 (1996); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Form of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997).

30
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prohibitions over the last thirty-five years vividly illustrates what
Professor Reva Siegel has referred to as a process of “preservationthrough-transformation,” that is, the process by which legal actors
abandon the “justificatory rhetoric” of an older, contested “status
regime” in favor of “new . . . reasons to protect” that regime.31
According to Siegel, the justificatory rhetoric that traditionally
supported status hierarchies based on sex and race has evolved in such a
way so as to assume a kinder, gentler face—a rhetorical transformation
that has, in turn, allowed for the continuation or preservation of those
same status hierarchies.32 In her seminal piece, Siegel focuses on the
evolution of the law’s treatment of (marital) domestic violence and on
the extent to which that evolution—or transformation—has worked to
preserve a pre-existing hierarchy based on gender within marriage.33
In this Section, I turn instead to the evolution of the procreation
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions and on the extent to which
that transformation has worked to preserve a pre-existing hierarchy
based on sexual orientation with respect to who might enter into a
marital relationship. The ‘cross-sex procreation is necessary to
propagate the species’ argument has ceded to more innocuous-sounding
procreation rhetoric that ironically casts sexual orientation minorities in
a more positive light than their cross-sex counterparts. Nevertheless,
and partly because current justificatory rhetoric sounds more
complimentary to gays and lesbians than did prior procreationist
rhetoric, the pre-existing status hierarchy that excludes same-sex
couples from marriage has remained largely in place.
2.

Procreation Rationale: Evolution

During the early same-sex marriage litigation in the 1970s,
courts routinely adverted to the traditional version of the procreation
rationale in sustaining those prohibitions against a range of state and
federal constitutional challenges. In most of those cases, the procreation
rationale appeared alongside the strict definitional approach to marriage,
that is, the circular argument that marriage is by definition a civil
31

Siegel, The Rule of Love, supra note _____ at 2179.
See id.
33
See id. at 1119.
32
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contract between a man and a woman.34 In the process, sexual
procreation—that is, both the ability and the capacity to procreate
sexually—became the critical feature that distinguished same-sex
relations from the cross-sex paradigm of reproduction.
In the first case to uphold the constitutionality of a same-sex
marriage prohibition, Baker v. Nelson,35 the Supreme Court of
Minnesota cited biblical authority and Supreme Court precedent,
respectively, when it observed that “[t]he institution of marriage as a
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and
rearing of children within family, is as old as the book of Genesis,”36
and, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, that “[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”37 The
Baker court’s linking of marriage and a certain kind of procreation—
presumably that of the sexual variety—through Skinner quickly became
authority for courts first considering the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage prohibitions in the 1970s. Thus, in Singer v. Hara,38 the
Washington Court of Appeals reasoned that the state’s refusal to grant a
marriage license to two males was “not based upon [their] status as
males” (and therefore in violation of that state’s equal rights
amendment) but rather “upon the state’s recognition that our society as a
whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for
procreation and the rearing of children.”39 The court at once made clear
that by “appropriate and desirable forum for procreation” its focus was
not so much on the kind of family that a child would be born into but
rather on the kind of parents who were having (or who could have) a
child in the first place—namely, those who were biologically equipped
to reproduce sexually with each other. As the court remarked: “The fact
remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily
because of societal values associated with the propagation of the human
34
For this strict definitional approach, see Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 n.2
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (“The dictionary definition of the term ‘spouse’ is "a husband or wife; either
member of a married couple spoken of in relation to the other”), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.
1982); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (same).
35
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question,
409 U.S. 810 (1972).
36
Id. at 186.
37
Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
38
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App.. 1974).
39
Id. at 1195.
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race . . . . [I]t is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility
of the birth of children by their union.”40
Courts hearing constitutional challenges to same-sex marriage
prohibitions in the 1980s and 1990s continued to support the
definitional approach to marriage by adverting to the procreation
rationale and by using sexual procreation to distinguish same- and crosssex relationships. For instance, in Adams v. Howerton, a federal district
court in California looked favorably upon that state’s same-sex marriage
prohibition in part because “the main justification in this age for societal
recognition and protection of the institution of marriage is procreation,
perpetuation of the race.”41 In upholding the lower court’s ruling—
which dealt not with a same-sex marriage prohibition per se but rather
with whether a same-sex partner constituted a “spouse” under the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952—the Ninth Circuit observed
that because “homosexual marriages never produce offspring,”42 samesex marriage prohibitions were permissible under both the federal and
the state constitutions. For this reason, two men could not be
considered “spouses” for federal immigration purposes.43
Similarly, in Dean v. District of Columbia,44 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia relied heavily on sexual
procreation when it upheld the District’s same-sex marriage prohibition
against both a due process and an equal protection challenge. As with
Baker and its progeny, Dean cited Skinner for the proposition that
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race.”45 Moreover, the Dean court remarked that “in
40

Id; see also Hatcher v. Hatcher, 580 S.W.2d 475, 483 (Ark. 1979) (citing the dictionary
definition of marriage as “a contract between a man (husband) and a woman (wife)” and
supporting that definition by observing that “[m]arriage is an important institution that is
fundamental to our very existence and survival”) (citations omitted); Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (same).
41
486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1360
(App. 1994), review denied (1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 73 n.8 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J.,
dissenting) (same); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 954 (Pa. Super. 1984) (same).
42
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1043.
43
Id. at 1043; see also Constant A., v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 18 n.6 (Pa. Super. 1985)
(remarking that “[i]f the traditional family relationship (lifestyle) was [sic] banned, human
society would disappear in little more than one generation. . . A primary function of government
and law is to preserve and perpetuate society . . . .”).
44
653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
45
Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
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recognizing a fundamental right to marry, the [Supreme] Court has only
contemplated marriages between persons of opposite sexes—persons
who had the possibility of having children with each other,”46 as well as
that “the aspect of marriage that elevates it to a ‘fundamental’ right
under the due process clause [is] the capacity to have children
together.”47
On one level, the Dean court’s procreative reasoning placed it
directly on the line of cases, starting with Baker, which drew a link
between marriage and sexual procreation and at the very least suggested
that the right to marry rested upon the biological possibility to procreate
sexually. Under this view, sexual procreation constituted the primary
axis around which the right to marry revolved and according to which it
was defined, and was the central feature that distinguished same- and
cross-sex relationships. On another level, however, Dean’s justificatory
rhetoric in other parts of the opinion foreshadows the different sort of
procreative reasoning that has appeared in the more recent same-sex
marriage cases. More specifically, although Dean suggests that the
possibility of sexual procreation is a necessary (albeit not sufficient)
attribute of marriage, it also suggests in another part of the opinion that
the “principal purpose [of marriage is]: to regulate and legitimize the
procreation of children.”48 Here, the focus is not so much on sexual
procreation and on the propagation of the species that it ostensibly
guarantees, but rather on the fact that marriage provides a forum for
responsible procreation—as the primary or “principal” objective of
marriage shifts from procreation per se to the legitimization of children
who are procreated outside a marital context.
This modified version of the procreation justification that
appears alongside the old version in Dean has become the predominant
procreationist rationale in recent same-sex marriage litigation. To be
sure, and contrary to Cicchino’s assertion that procreation as
“propagation of the species” is “no longer taken seriously by courts,”49
residues of the former procreationist rhetoric continue to appear in some
of the more recent same-sex marriage cases.50 Increasingly, however,
46

Id.
Id. at 335.
48
Id. at 337 (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385-86; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
49
Cicchino, supra note _____, at 151.
50
See, e.g., Smelt v. City of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 880 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d in part,
47
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courts are contemplating a more fully developed version of the so-called
“private welfare rationale”51 to which the Dean court gave nod—a
rationale that reflects an anxiety over the extent to which same-sex
relations/reproduction is similar to, rather than different from, cross-sex
relations/reproduction. More specifically, most courts have found that
procreation constitutes a rational basis for marriage statutes that exclude
same-sex partners from their definitional ambit because “[m]arriage’s
vital purpose is not to mandate procreation but to control or ameliorate
its consequences—the so-called ‘private welfare’ purpose. To maintain
otherwise is to ignore procreation’s centrality to marriage.”52
In a nutshell, the private welfare procreation rationale proceeds
as follows: The state’s predominant objective in regulating marriage is
to provide a forum in which responsible child-bearing and child-rearing
may occur and to ensure that children are legitimized—not, as the
former same-sex marriage cases suggested, to mandate that procreation
occur within marriage in the first place. Furthermore, cross-sex
reproduction can be—and often is—accidental; same-sex reproduction,
however, can only ever be the product of choice, planning, and
forethought. While the state has an interest in ensuring that cross-sex
reproduction take place responsibly—and in decreasing the overall
number of non-marital children—the state has little interest in ensuring
that same-sex reproduction take place responsibly since same-sex
couples already assume that responsibility for themselves (and their
children) by virtue of the very manner in which they reproduce. It
therefore follows that because same-sex marriage bears no relation to
the state’s interest in creating a forum in which either responsible crosssex reproduction or the legitimization of non-marital children may
occur, statutes that limit marriage to cross-sex individuals are
constitutional under the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. Interestingly,
although this newer version of the procreation rationale for same-sex
marriage prohibitions continues to highlight the differences between
‘natural’ cross-sex reproduction and ‘artificial’ same-sex reproduction,
it implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) acknowledges a similarity
rev’d in part, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that “procreation is necessary to perpetuate
humankind, encouraging the optimal union for procreation is a legitimate government interest”);
Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 269 (N.J. Super. 2005) (same).
51
Lewis, 875 A.2d at 276 (Parrillo, J.A.D., concurring).
52
Id.
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between these two modes of reproduction—namely, the fact that samesex couples can reproduce and are reproducing.53
A more detailed explanation of this so-called ‘private welfare
rationale’ appears in Morrison v. Sadler,54 where the Indiana Court of
Appeals upheld that state’s same-sex marriage prohibition exclusively
on the ground that it advanced the state’s legitimate interest in
encouraging responsible procreation between cross-sex couples. Its
explanation, which is representative of the current version of the
procreation rationale and which has been cited favorably by several
courts, is worth quoting in full:
Becoming a parent by using “artificial”
reproduction methods is frequently costly and timeconsuming. Adopting children is much the same. Those
persons wanting to have children by assisted
reproduction or adoption are, by necessity, heavily
invested, financially and emotionally, in those processes.
Those processes also require a great deal of foresight
and planning. “Natural” procreation, on the other hand,
may occur only between opposite-sex couples and with
no foresight or planning. All that is required is one
instance of sexual intercourse with a man for a woman
to become pregnant.
What does the difference between “natural”
reproduction on the one hand and assisted reproduction
and adoption on the other mean for constitutional
purposes? It means that it impacts the State of Indiana’s
clear interest in seeing that children are raised in stable
environments. Those persons who have invested the
significant time, effort, and expense associated with
assisted reproduction or adoption may be seen as very
likely to be able to provide such an environment, with or
without the “protections” of marriage, because of the
high level of financial and emotional commitment
exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or children in
53
54

See also Dean, 653 A.2d at 336; Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999).
821 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ind. App. 2005).
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the first place.
By contrast, procreation by “natural”
reproduction may occur without any thought for the
future. The State, first of all, may legitimately create the
institution of opposite-sex marriage, and all the benefits
accruing to it, in order to encourage male-female couples
to procreate within the legitimacy and stability of a statesanctioned relationship and to discourage unplanned,
out-of-wedlock births resulting from “casual”
intercourse. Second, even where an opposite-sex couple
enters into a marriage with no intention of having
children, “accidents” do happen, or persons often change
their minds about wanting to have children. The
institution of marriage not only encourages opposite-sex
couples to form a relatively stable environment for the
“natural” procreation of children in the first place, but it
also encourages them to stay together and raise a child or
children together if there is a “change in plans.”55
In other words, procreation is a rational basis for same-sex marriage
prohibitions because “recognition of same-sex marriage would not
promote the State’s interest in marital procreation, particularly
unintended procreation from heterosexual intercourse.”56 In Part IV, I
will return to the Morrison court’s framing of same-sex reproduction as
a ‘better,’ more efficient product than its cross-sex counterpart and will
there suggest that this image of same-sex procreation ironically conflicts
with the image of same-sex procreation as counterfeit that has emerged
from the same-sex marriage debate.
As with Morrison, the more recent same-sex marriage cases
reflect a similar shift in the courts’ procreative reasoning, as the
‘encouraging procreation for the perpetuation of humankind’ argument
has evolved into the ‘managing procreation as the consequence of
heterosexual sex’ argument.57 Curiously, and somewhat ironically,
55

Id. at 20-23 (footnotes omitted).
Hernandez v. Robles, 26 A.D.3d 98, 126 (N.Y. 2005), aff’d, Hernandez v. Robles, 2006 WL
1835429, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 05239 (N.Y. Jul 6, 2006).
57
See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“DOMA
‘encourage[s] the creation of stable relationships that facilitate the rearing of children by both of
56
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courts no longer cast same-sex couples seeking marital rights in terms of
what they lack—namely, the ability to procreate sexually and thereby to
help perpetuate the human race. Rather, the current deployment of the
procreation rationale casts same-sex couples who wish to reproduce in
terms of what they alone possess—namely, the ability to procreate
responsibly every time they wish to do so. Moreover, because same-sex
reproduction is allegedly better than its cross-sex counterpart, same-sex
couples and their families neither need nor require the state’s protection
in the form of marriage. While courts therefore continue to emphasize
the difference between same-and cross-sex relationships, artificial
reproduction has replaced the mere ability to reproduce sexually (and to
propagate the species) as the key diacritical feature that distinguishes
those relationships and that renders differential treatment of them
constitutionally relevant.
At the same time, however, the fact that courts like Morrison are
acknowledging that same-sex couples can reproduce and are
reproducing suggests an implicit recognition of—and discomfort with—
the very thing, procreation, that is starting to bridge the gap between
same- and cross-sex couples. Although same-sex couples cannot
reproduce through sexual means with each other, the fact remains that
artificial reproductive technology—less common during the early phases
of same-sex marriage litigation, when the ‘procreation as propagation’
rationale was at its height—offers them the opportunity to procreate and
to generate a ‘product’ that looks very much like the ‘original’ model of
their biological parents’”) (quoting, in part, the federal government’s Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.# 39), pp. 15-16)); Hernandez, 26 A.D. 3d at 126 (“recognition of
same-sex marriage would not promote the State’s interest in marital procreation, particularly
unintended procreation from heterosexual intercourse, nor would it promote the State’s interest
in dual-gender parenting”); Shields v. Madigan, 5 Misc. 3d 901 (N.Y. Sup. 2004) (stating that
“[a]pplying the rational basis test, this court concludes that preserving the institution of
marriage for opposite sex couples serves the valid public purpose of preserving the historic
institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, which, in turn, uniquely fosters
procreation” and that “[t]he institution of marriage is a fundamental right founded on the
distinction of sex and the potential for procreation”) (emphasis added); Standhardt, 77 P.3d at
463; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1002 (Mass. 2003) (“If society
proceeds similarly to recognize marriages between same-sex couples who cannot procreate, it . .
. might result in the mistaken view that civil marriage has little to do with procreation: just as
the potential of procreation would not be necessary for a marriage to be valid, marriage would
not be necessary for optimal procreation and child rearing to occur. In essence, the Legislature
could conclude that the consequence of such a policy shift would be a diminution in society’s
ability to steer the acts of procreation and child rearing into their most optimal setting)” (Cordy,
J., dissenting).
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cross-sex reproduction. As one court recently noted, “[t]o be precise,
same-sex couples can cause procreation. A female capable of producing
children can be married to another female and become pregnant through
various methods, then produce and raise the child in her same-sex
union. Similarly, a same-sex male couple could cause a female to
become pregnant, directly or otherwise, and later adopt and raise the
child.”58 This explicit recognition of the ability of same-sex couples to
“cause procreation” signals not only a notable shift from earlier
procreationist rhetoric that deployed procreation in order to distinguish
same- and cross-sex relationships, but also a growing awareness of the
extent to which those relationships are starting to look more, not less,
like each other.
In the next Section, I will address some criticisms of the
procreation rationale both in its past formulation as ‘marriage
encourages the propagation of the species’ and its current formulation as
‘marriage encourages responsible cross-sex procreation and the
legitimization of children.’ These criticisms neglect to explain why that
rationale, notwithstanding its obvious flaws, is doing most of the work
to sustain same-sex marriage prohibitions today. More important, they
fail to recognize how the recent analogy between counterfeiting and
same-sex relations provides a clue as to what is behind the courts’
procreative logic.
B.

Procreation Rationale: Criticisms

Several commentators, and a few courts, have observed that the
procreation rationale is unconvincing and vulnerable to attack. Their
58
Coordination Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, 2005 WL 583129, at
*12 n.3 (Mar. 14, 2005) (emphasis added); see also Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc. 3d 459, 484
(N.Y. Sup. 2005), rev’d and vacated by 26 A.D.3d 98, 126 (N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 2006 WL
1835429, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 05239 (N.Y. Jul 6, 2006) (“the reality is that significant numbers
of couples in New York have formed same-sex families, and numerous couples will continue to
do so, whether they are allowed to marry or not”); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d at 285 (“the claim
that the promotion of procreation is a vital element of marriage and justifies exclusion of
persons of the same gender falls on its face when confronted with reproductive science and
technology. The fact is some persons in committed same-sex relationships can and do legally
and functionally procreate”) (Collester, J.A.D., dissenting); Castle v. State, 2004 WL 1985215,
at *14 (Wash. Super. Sept. 7, 2004), rev’d, Andersen v. King County, --- P.3d ----, 2006 WL
2073138 (Wash. Jul 26, 2006) (same); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962 n.24 (same); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d at 881 (same).
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criticisms focus on the rationale’s tenuous legal grounding, questionable
factual grounding, or both, as well as on its inaccurate portrayal of the
contemporary family.
First, and with respect to the ‘procreation as propagation’
argument, some critics have relied on cases like Skinner v. Oklahoma59
and Turner v. Safley60 to rebut the contention that the fundamental right
to marry is conditioned on the ability to procreate.61 Other critics have
turned to the law governing the grounds for marital annulments and
divorces in order to refute the notion that procreation is a necessary
condition of marriage. 62 Relying, in part, on the fraudulent inducement
to marry line of cases, they have argued that fraud with respect to a
spouse’s ability or willingness to procreate, rather than a spouse’s innate
capacity to procreate, is the driving force behind the law’s treatment of
marital annulments/divorces on the basis of fraud.63 In Coordination
Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, the
California Superior Court also noted this distinction when it looked
unfavorably upon that state’s use of the fraudulent inducement to marry
line of cases in support of the procreation rationale for its same-sex
marriage prohibition. As the court remarked, “the cases cited by the
[State] do not establish that California courts have recognized that the
purpose of marriage in this state is procreation. Instead, these cases
establish that annulment is a remedy for the fraudulent inducement to
59

316 U.S. 535 (1942).
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
61
See Comment, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 114 YALE L.J. 1989, 1994 (2005). The
Comment argues that the Skinner Court’s use of the conjunctive “and” in its celebrated
declaration about the importance of procreation to the “survival of the race” suggests
“independence, not confluence, between marriage and procreation.” Id. at 1994. In addition,
Skinner was not a fundamental right to marry case, but involved the unequal application of a
state law that both interfered with procreation as “one of the basic civil rights of man” and
violated the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. As such, the
Court’s “discussion of marriage was incidental to its discussion of the importance of
procreation.” Id. at 1994. Nowhere in that opinion does the Court even remotely suggest that
the “basic civil right” to marry is dependent on the “basic civil right” to procreate or that the
right to marry is only considered to be a fundamental for those who are able to procreate
sexually with each other.
62
See, e.g., Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1089, 1092 (2002) (stating that “the State’s interest in the sexual component of marriage has
traditionally been implicated only by the potential for children to be born outside of it, rather
than by a need to encourage or guarantee procreation”).
63
See id.
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marry.”64 Finally, still other critics and courts have responded to the
‘procreation as propagation’ rationale by simply noting its flagrant overand underinclusiveness,65 its tenuous grounding in logic, and its
complete lack of empirical, factual support.66
Second, and with respect to the ‘encouraging responsible
procreation’ argument, some courts have flatly remarked that “the
prevention of same-sex marriages is wholly unconnected to promoting
the rearing of children by married, opposite sex-parents.”67
Remarkably, even courts that have upheld same-sex marriage
prohibitions have observed that the ‘encouraging responsible
procreation’ rationale is troubling because such reasoning would appear
to militate against marital rights for those individuals who either cannot
reproduce or do not want to. Concurring in Morrison, one judge voiced
his misgivings over the majority’s conclusion that the same-sex
marriage prohibition at issue in that case was constitutional because it
rested on the rational basis of “encourag[ing] responsible procreation,
and same-sex couples cannot procreate through sexual intercourse.”68
The judge “admit[ted] that I am somewhat troubled by this reasoning.
Pursuant to this rationale, the State presumably could also prohibit
sterile individuals or women past their child-bearing years from
marrying. In fact, I would assume the State may place any restrictions
on the right to marry that do not negatively impact the State’s interest in
64

2005 WL 583129, at *8; see also Lewis, 875 A.2d at 285 (“if procreation or the ability to
procreate is central to marriage, logic dictates that the inability to procreate would constitute
grounds for its termination. However, as opposed to the inability or unwillingness to engage in
sexual intercourse, the inability or refusal to procreate is not a legal basis for divorce or
annulment”) (Collester, J.A.D., dissenting).
65
See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note ______, at 205 (stating that the procreation rationale would
appear to “expose a potential political flaw in the procreation argument: by repeatedly
emphasizing the importance of procreation in marriage, opponents of gay marriage run the risk
of demeaning the many married couples for whom procreation is either unwanted or physically
impossible”); Lewis, 875 A.2d at 289 (Collester, J.A.D., dissenting); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at
961; Baker, 744 A.2d at 881.
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See, e.g., Carpenter; supra note _____, at 194 (“If Western civilization is truly facing a
population implosion, as some suggest, that is attributable to many factors other than gay
marriage”); Dean v. Conaway, 2006 WL 148145, at *7 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2006) (“This
Court, like others, can find no rational connection between the prevention of same-sex
marriages and an increase or decrease in the number of heterosexual marriages or of children
born to those unions”); Lewis, 875 A.2d at 289 (same) (Collester, J.A.D., dissenting).
67
Dean, 2006 WL 148145, at *7.
68
Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 36 (Friedlander, J., concurring in the result).
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encouraging fertile, opposite-sex couples to marry.”69
While useful, these criticisms neglect to consider precisely why
procreationist rhetoric has persisted despite its myriad flaws. If the
Supreme Court has suggested that the fundamental right to marry is not
reserved to those who are able (or who want) to procreate, and if the law
governing marital annulments is clear that procreation is not a necessary
condition of marriage, then why have courts given—and, in some
instances, continue to give—such weight to the ‘procreation as
propagation’ rationale? Moreover, if the ‘encouraging responsible
procreation’ rationale lacks even a remote connection to same-sex
marriage prohibitions, why has it become the main procreation-centered
rationale in same-sex marriage litigation today? Put more simply, what
is really doing the work to sustain either version of the procreation
justification? Understanding the history and theory behind the
deployment of counterfeiting language to describe non-normative sexual
and reproductive relationships gets us one step closer to discerning: (1)
why same-sex marriage provokes such anxiety among marriage
traditionalists today; (2) why procreation remains their overriding
concern; and (3) the logic on which both versions of the procreation
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions rest. At this point,
however, I briefly offer three reasons why we should be thinking about
same-sex marriage prohibitions in the larger context of fraud—of which
counterfeiting is a variety.
First, it is not an accident that states like California in the
Marriage Cases are citing to the fraudulent inducement to marry line of
cases in support of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage
prohibitions.70 While a few commentators (and at least one court) have
remarked that those cases do not stand for the proposition that
procreation is a necessary condition of marriage,71 some of the
fraudulent inducement cases and their not-so-distant relatives—those
cases in which annulments and/or divorces are granted on the basis of
impotency—do stand for a very important point that the critical
commentary has overlooked: the idea that marriage without sexual
procreation is in some sense a sham and a fraud—not a ‘real’ or ‘true’
69

Id. at 37.
2005 WL 583129, at **6-8.
71
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marriage at all.
For instance, in Santos v. Santos,72 a fraudulent inducement case,
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island granted a husband-spouse’s petition
for divorce on the ground that his wife concealed an intention, allegedly
formed prior to the marriage, not to engage in “normal sexual
intercourse”73 with him during the marriage and a desire “to engage . . .
in unnatural intercourse” with him instead.74 Although the court did not
elaborate specifically on what it meant by “unnatural sexual
intercourse,” it did suggest that the term was synonymous with nonprocreative sex of the sort engaged in between members of the same
sex—as the wife left her husband after only three days of marriage “to
associate with a girl friend of questionable reputation, for whose love
she professed a preference.”75 In keeping with the law governing
fraudulent inducements to marry, the court granted the husband’s
petition on the ground that the wife did not enter into the marriage in
good faith.76 More interesting, however, is the court’s suggestion that
what was fraudulent about the wife’s behavior was not only the
concealment of her true intention at the time the marriage was
contracted, but also the “unnatural intercourse” in which she allegedly
sought to engage with her husband; as the court remarked, “the only
reasonable inference from the uncontradicted and unexplained evidence
of her own conduct . . . is that from the beginning she had not intended
to enter into a true marriage.”77 In other words, the marriage was
fraudulent not only because the wife withheld information from her
husband at the outset of the marriage, but also because she wanted to
engage in a certain kind of sex with him—namely, non-procreative
sexual intercourse—that rendered their marriage less authentic or “true.”
Similarly, in D. v. C.,78 a New Jersey court granted a wife’s
petition for annulment on the ground that she suffered from
“vaginismus, ‘an emotional or mental disorder’” that rendered her
impotent—even though “she was normal organically and
72
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anatomically.”79 Because the wife was allegedly ignorant of her
condition prior to marriage, D. v. C. was not a fraudulent inducement
case per se; rather, what was at issue there was whether the wife, as the
impotent spouse, could bring the annulment action or whether such
actions were available to potent spouses only.80 Nevertheless, D. v. C.
is interesting because it raises the idea, of particular relevance here, that
marriage without penetrative, procreative sex is a sham or an inauthentic
marriage—a fraud even in the absence of actual fraudulent conduct. As
the court stated in dicta after finding that annulment actions could be
brought by either the potent or the impotent party: “The public interest
in dissolving a mock marriage is the same whichever of the parties is
capable.”81 The fact that the D. v. C. court uses language resonant of
fraud—“mock marriage”—is particularly noteworthy because the court
was not dealing with a fraudulent inducement case at all. Indeed, the
fact that the wife was acting in good faith with respect to her alleged
condition did not render her ‘non-procreative’ marriage any more true
and any less a counterfeit.
The language that the courts use in these cases to describe nonprocreative, non-penetrative sexual acts (Santos) and the incapacity to
have procreative sex (D. v. C.), suggests that a marriage that exists
without procreative intercourse is a sham or “mock” marriage—a fraud
in and of itself. It could be, then, that lawmakers are relying on the
fraudulent inducement to marry line of cases (and on the annulment of
marriage/divorce cases more generally) in support of same-sex marriage
prohibitions currently because they are at the very least thinking about
same-sex relationships as fraudulent in the sense that they are nonprocreative and therefore a travesty of the ‘true’ or authentic thing.
Second, it makes sense to think about same-sex marriage in
terms of fraud because certain legal academics have both implicitly and
explicitly conceptualized the state’s recognition of that relationship as a
kind of fraud. In Sex and Reason, Judge Richard Posner contended that
“[p]ermitting homosexual marriage would place government in a
dishonest position of propagating a false picture of the reality of
homosexuals’ lives.”82 More recently—and, indeed, more explicitly—
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Professor Lynn Wardle has remarked that “if same-sex unions do not
contribute to the essential social purposes of marriage, a state that
confers the legal status of marriage upon same-sex unions commits
fraud when it presents a false image of same-sex unions as comparable
to traditional marriage.”83
Third, the policy rhetoric surrounding the same-sex marriage
debate makes explicit this connection between same-sex marriage and
fraud that emerges in the cases and the academic commentary alike. It
is to this rhetoric and its implications that I now turn.
II.

THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE & THE
COUNTERFEITING ANALOGY: A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE
Comparisons between same-sex relations and counterfeiting
have become so common and so frequent in the rhetoric surrounding the
same-sex marriage (and same-sex civil unions) debate that they all but
escape our attention. This Part looks at those comparisons in order to
foreground a rhetorical trope whose sheer pervasiveness often causes us
to forget that it is there in the first place—and, more important, to
overlook the extent to which that trope just does not hold up. Section A
will provide an exhaustive survey of the recent analogies that lawmakers
and same-sex marriage opponents have made between same-sex
relations and counterfeiting—analogies that have, in fact, started to find
their way into court decisions. Section B will then demonstrate the
ways in which the counterfeiting trope is descriptively inaccurate as
applied to both civil unions and same-sex marriage—thus forcing one to
ask just why that trope has persisted notwithstanding its imprecision.
A. Counterfeiting Rhetoric in Law and Policy Today
Opponents of rights and benefits for same-sex couples in the
form of civil unions84 and domestic partnership recognition85 routinely
83
Lynn Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State
Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 775 (2001) (emphasis
added).
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Civil unions are state-sanctioned relationships between two same-sex individuals.
Connecticut and Vermont are the only two jurisdictions in the United States that recognize civil
unions between same-sex partners. See Connecticut Substitute Senate Bill 963 (2005); VT.
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conceptualize such ‘marriage approximations’ or ‘marriage equivalents’
in the language of counterfeit. For instance, just one month after the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Robert Knight accused
“homosexual activists”—that is, the gay and lesbian partners of victims
of the 9/11 attacks who sought benefits from the September 11 Victim
Compensation Fund and the American Red Cross—of “trying to hijack
the moral capital of marriage and apply it to their own relationships,”
which he characterized as “counterfeit marriage.”86 In just a single
stroke, Knight managed to conflate genuine terrorism, “homosexual”
activism, same-sex relationships, and counterfeiting in a way that
situated those four varieties of ‘assault’ on the same symbolic plane and
that no doubt resonated with a public intensely fearful of each.87
Like Knight, Janet La Rue, Chief Counsel for Concerned
Women for America (CWA), has deployed similar—albeit less
incendiary—counterfeiting rhetoric to describe the legal regime that
would have existed under the version of the Federal Marriage
Amendment (FMA) that was first introduced in Congress in 2002. The
original version of the FMA, which failed to pass in the Senate in 2003,
defined marriage as a “union between a man and a woman,” and stated,
in part, that “[n]either this Constitution or the constitution of any state,
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1201(4) (2003).
85
A domestic partnership is a legal relationship recognized by the state and/or jurisdiction in
which it is entered; unlike civil unions, domestic partnership recognition does not guarantee the
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Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia are the only jurisdictions in the United
States that recognize domestic partnerships (but not civil unions) between two same-sex
individuals.
86
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Dobson,
Dr.
Dobson’s
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at
http://www.family.org/docstudy/newsletters/a0019238.html. (Feb. 9, 2004) (charging New York
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nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or
groups.”88 The 2006 version of the FMA, which failed to pass in the
Senate in June 2006, altered some of the language of the 2002 version to
read, in part, that “[n]either this Constitution, nor the constitution of any
State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a
woman.”89 Whereas the 2006 version, unlike its predecessor, targets the
“unions” of same-sex couples exclusively, both versions leave open the
possibility that state legislatures will confer the “legal incidents” of
marriage upon unmarried same-sex couples—even if they are not
required to do so under either the federal Constitution or their respective
state constitutions. While the drafters and proponents of the FMA
contended that “[t]he traditional autonomy of state legislatures on family
law matters is preserved by the text of the Amendment,”90 La Rue
decried the counterfeit scheme that its permissive language failed to
capture:
America has federal laws to protect our currency
because we recognize that counterfeit currency is a
serious threat to our national economy. We must have
laws to preserve and protect marriage because
counterfeit marriage is a serious threat to the stability of
society and the health and welfare of children. CWA
opposes the Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) [of
2002] because it would not prevent state legislatures
from recognizing and benefiting civil unions and other
88
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such relationships, which would result in legalized
counterfeit
marriage.91
La Rue further remarked that “[t]he FMA does not prevent legislative
acts that would create civil unions that are counterfeit marriages.
Although legally distinct from marriage, it is a distinction without a
difference in all other respects.”92 For this reason, “CWA believes that
an amendment to preserve marriage should do more than preserve it in
name only.”93
Knight and La Rue’s comparison of civil unions to counterfeit
currency has become a routine way of characterizing any legal regime
that recognizes either, or both, civil unions and the extension of
marriage-like rights to same-sex couples. Thus, when the St. Thomas
More Law Center sued the Ann Arbor, Michigan public school district
in 2003 for using taxpayers’ dollars to extend insurance benefits to
same-sex partners, Richard Thompson, the Center’s chief counsel,
stated that “[t]he purpose of this lawsuit is to stop these counterfeit
marriages.”94 Similarly, supporters of Utah’s Amendment 3, which both
defines marriage exclusively in cross-sex terms and provides that “[n]o
other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a
marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect,”
stated that the amendment would, among other things, “[p]revent the
creation of ‘counterfeit marriages,’ such as civil unions.”95 Supporters
of similar amendments and laws in other states, like Arkansas,
Pennsylvania and Ohio, have remarked that an expansive marriage
protection amendment is necessary in order to prevent “counterfeit
marriage that devalue[s] traditional marriage in the same way
counterfeit money devalues real money,”96 “to prevent same-sex
91
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marriage [and] its counterfeit—civil unions,”97 and to “identif[y]
marriage as having a unique place in our society and protect[ ] it from
any counterfeits,”98 respectively.
Some opponents of civil unions and similar de facto marriage
‘equivalents’ push the counterfeiting metaphor even further to suggest a
parallel relationship between the injurious effects of counterfeit
currency on the actual capital of the economy and the injurious effects
of de facto marriage on the symbolic capital of marriage itself. As one
representative in Virginia’s House of Delegates opined: “Counterfeit
money hurts our wallets. Counterfeit marriage will do the same to real
marriage. Homosexuals need no special institution parallel to marriage,
such as civil unions, to enjoy the same rights under law to vote, buy a
house, go to public colleges, start businesses, and exercise rights and
opportunities now available to all Virginians.”99 Or, as Tony Perkins,
President of the Family Research Council, recently remarked: “We do
not support the civil union and domestic partnership laws because we
see them as counterfeit institutions. Just as counterfeit $20 bills impact
our economy, we feel these counterfeit unions have an impact on our
culture.”100 For these and other marriage traditionalists who flatly
oppose the extension of legal and economic benefits to same-sex
couples, “[c]ivil unions are nothing but a counterfeit form of marriage.
Just as counterfeiting currency has the potential to bankrupt an
economy, redefining the social foundation of civilization by
transforming homosexual behavior into a public norm has the potential
to wreak havoc on social life as Americans know it.”101 It is worth
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noting that similar counterfeiting analogies also surfaced in the debate
surrounding the extension of ‘marriage-like’ benefits to same-sex
couples in England during the passage of the Relationships (Civil
Registration) Bill, which became law in that country on November 18,
2004. Simon Calvert, Deputy Director of The Christian Institute in
England, remarked that the effect of the Bill would be to “devalue[e] the
currency of marriage in the law. It’s Monopoly money—not the real
thing.”102
Just as civil unions, domestic partnerships, and benefits for
same-sex couples more generally have been compared to a counterfeit
form of marriage, so, too, has same-sex marriage itself been compared
to a counterfeit form of the cross-sex archetype. Robert Knight relied
on the counterfeiting trope as early as 1995, when he stated that
“[s]ame-sex couples do not qualify [for marriage]. It might be called a
partnership, but if it’s called marriage, it’s a counterfeit version. And
counterfeit versions drive out the real thing.”103 More recently, and as
mentioned in this Article’s Introduction, Marilyn Musgrave deployed
the analogy in support of the Federal Marriage Amendment in 2003.104
Since that time, a significant number of same-sex marriage opponents
have made such remarks as same-sex marriage is “a counterfeit, which
cheapens the real thing”105 and “[s]ame sex [sic] marriage devalues
traditional marriage the same way counterfeit money devalues real
currency.”106 In their view, “it is a falsehood to call it a marriage.
Those who are claiming social or legal recognition of their relationship
as if it were a true marriage are thus asking society and the law to affirm
a falsehood.”107 Indeed, testifying before the Maryland House Judiciary
Committee in January 2006 in support of that state’s proposed marriage
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amendment, Knight remarked that “creating counterfeits [like same-sex
marriage] undermines support in the law and culture for the real
thing.”108 Or, as made clear in a public statement issued by the St.
Thomas More Law Center immediately after the successful passage of a
constitutional marriage amendment in Michigan on Election Day, 2004:
“The amendment is intended to prohibit courts or other efforts to impose
same-sex marriage, polygamy, or any other form of counterfeit
‘marriage’ on the state.”109 Similar counterfeiting rhetoric has also
surfaced in the controversy over same-sex marriage in Spain, which
legalized that relationship in 2005. Following the Spanish cabinet’s
approval of a proposal allowing same-sex couples both to marry and to
adopt children—a proposal signed into law on July 2, 2005—Juan
Antonio Martinez Camp, a spokesperson for the Spanish Bishops’
Conference, stated on national television that “permitting same-sex
marriage would be like ‘imposing a virus on society’” and that “the
decision would be tantamount to introducing ‘a counterfeit currency’” in
Spain.110
Opponents of same-sex marriage have deployed counterfeiting
rhetoric to convey not only their concern that same-sex marriage
cheapens and devalues its cross-sex counterpart, but also their belief that
same-sex partnerships are intrinsically non-procreative. As Janet LaRue
remarked:
Granting same-sex couples a license to marry will not
create true marriage. Neither two men nor two women
can become one flesh. Licensing the unnatural does not
make it natural. It would be a state-sanctioned
counterfeit, a sham and a fraud. A licensed electrician
cannot produce power by taping two same-sex plugs
together. Homosexual sex is dangerous and destructive
to the human body and powerless for human
108
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reproduction.111
This idea that two (or too) similar entities—two same-sex electrical
plugs, two men, two women—cannot mix in a positively reproductive
way, resonates with a similar analogy that was recently made by Glen
Lavy, Senior Counsel of the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) and Senior
Vice President of ADF’s Marriage Litigation Center, in reference to a
lawsuit brought in Israel challenging that country’s same-sex marriage
prohibition. Commenting on one of the reasons why same-sex marriage
warrants prohibition, Lavy said: “It takes sodium and chloride to make
salt. If you add sodium to sodium, you don’t have salt. If you add
chloride to chloride, you don’t have salt . . . . It takes a man and a
woman to make babies.”112
The remarks of other commentators similarly evoke a connection
between counterfeit and ‘sterile’ sex. As one critic of same-sex
marriage commented:
A same-sex marriage is no marriage at all. It is a
counterfeit, a fraud. Governments have encouraged true
marriages because they stabilize society and benefit
governments in a dozen different ways. Same-sex
marriages are counterfeit, immoral, totally sterile,
lacking the No. 1 reason for marriage—procreation—
ignoring the wisdom of ages and common sense.113
The Catholic Civil Rights League of Ottowa, Canada, made this
connection between non-procreative sex and counterfeit even more
explicit:
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage is not related
to their homosexual orientation, or to them as
individuals. Rather, the exclusion of their relationship is
111
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related to the fact that it is not inherently procreative,
and, therefore, if it is included within marriage, marriage
cannot institutionalize and symbolize respect for the
transmission of life. To recognize same-sex relationships
as marriage would unavoidably change and eliminate
this function of marriage. Same-sex “marriage” devalues
the real thing in the same way that any counterfeit
devalues
the
authentic.114
It bears noting that similar statements have found their way into the
Congressional Record. Testifying before Congress on behalf of DOMA
in 1996, Gary Bauer, former President of the Family Research Council,
remarked that, were the state to recognize a marriage between same-sex
partners, “the fiction [of same-sex marriage would be] imposed on
everyone and the counterfeit [would] do great harm to the special status
that the institution has earned . . . [M]arriage is a unique bonding of the
two sexes, with the probable expectation of procreation of children . . . .
[C]reating a counterfeit would be a slap in the face to millions of
Americans.”115 Indeed, all of these statements call to mind the D. v. C.
court’s remarks that even a cross-sex marriage without procreative sex
is a “mock marriage”—a “sham” and a “fraud”—as well as the Santos
court’s suggestion that a marriage without “normal sexual intercourse”
is not a “true marriage” at all.
B. Undoing the Counterfeiting Analogy
The counterfeiting trope that same-sex marriage opponents have
deployed to illustrate the threat that both civil unions and same-sex
marriage represent defies logic for the following reason: neither civil
unions nor same-sex marriage as their opponents conceptualize them
resembles what we typically think about when we think about
counterfeits.
For instance, La Rue notes that the only difference between
114
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marriage and civil unions represents a “distinction without a difference”
and that the original FMA as drafted preserved marriage “in name
only”—thus suggesting that civil unions and marriage are substantively
the same as, or at least similar to, each other. La Rue’s
conceptualization of civil unions as counterfeit, however, is
descriptively inaccurate because her vision of counterfeit does not
reflect what a ‘true’ counterfeit is. That is, we typically think about a
counterfeit as a product that is identical in form to, although different in
substance (or intrinsic worth) from, the original that it is attempting to
copy.116 Indeed, the critical difference between a Louis Vuitton original
and a Louis Vuitton counterfeit is the fact that the latter differs in
substance from the former even though the two assume the same name
or form—to wit, a Louis Vuitton. La Rue, however, appears to be
suggesting quite the opposite: while civil unions are nominally or
formally distinguishable from marriage (i.e., they are in name something
else), they are substantively similar to that institution (i.e., they
guarantee similar rights and benefits, thus differing “in name only”).
Under this formulation, civil unions are not a counterfeit at all because
they alert the public that they are not, in fact, a Louis Vuitton marriage
original.
Similarly, Knight’s deployment of the counterfeiting trope to
describe both same-sex marriage and civil unions does not hold up
because neither of those relationships is a true counterfeit. To recall, in
1995, Knight remarked that while same-sex couples might form a
partnership, they cannot form a genuine marriage: “if it’s called
marriage, it’s a counterfeit version. And counterfeit versions drive out
the real thing.”117 More recently, and with respect to the extension of
non-marital rights to same-sex partners, Knight has suggested that the
FMA “allows for legislatures to enact the rest of the homosexual agenda
right up to civil unions and other forms of counterfeit marriage. As
written, the amendment will give politicians cover while they promote
homosexuality by other means. . . . Marriage is too important to be
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defended in name only.”118
A fundamental incongruity marks Knight’s (and La Rue’s)
deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric to describe civil unions and samesex marriage. As with La Rue, in Knight’s estimation, the problem with
civil unions is that they are substantively similar to marriage but are
called something else—the only difference between them being a
nominal one that acts as a “cover” for what ‘really’ lies beneath.
Furthermore, the problem with same-sex marriage is that it both shares
all the attributes of marriage and is called the same thing: “if [a samesex ‘partnership’] is called something else [other than just a
‘partnership’], it’s counterfeit marriage.” In other words, if the problem
with civil unions is that they are nominally distinct from marriage but
possess many of the substantive attributes thereof, the problem with
same-sex marriage is that it both possesses all of the substantive
attributes of marriage and is called the same thing. What Knight fails to
recognize, however, is that, under this formulation, neither civil unions
nor same-sex marriage represents a true counterfeit—a product that
looks formally identical to (i.e., has the same name as), but is
substantively different from (i.e., has different attributes than), the
original that it is attempting to copy. In either instance, the
counterfeiting trope as it has been deployed fails accurately to depict
what is fraudulent about civil unions and marriage, respectively.
Indeed, to accuse same-sex couples of perpetrating a fraud is curious in
light of the fact that their relationships are so often characterized as a
form of flaunting that is best relegated to the closet. Unlike a
counterfeit, and as mentioned in the Introduction, same-sex marriage is,
for many, akin to the obscene: “I know it when I see it.”119
Given its descriptive imprecision, one wonders why the
counterfeiting trope has had such resonance in the same-sex marriage
debate. Put another way, what exactly is driving counterfeiting rhetoric
notwithstanding the fact that, when analyzed closely, neither same-sex
marriage nor civil unions is a ‘true’ or ‘real’ counterfeit? I submit that
the answer to both this question and that posed in the previous Part—
why the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions has
118
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persisted in the law despite its flaws—lies somewhere at the intersection
of counterfeiting and procreation. My claim here, which I will more
fully develop in the next two Parts, is the following: just as the
counterfeiting trope makes more sense when viewed in light of the
unnatural and deceptive non-procreative acts that it signifies, the
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions makes more
sense when viewed as a kind of counterfeit or fraud perpetrated upon the
public. While procreation alone might not constitute even a rational
basis for same-sex marriage prohibitions, the prevention of fraud surely
does. For this reason, it is necessary to understand the relationship
between counterfeiting and procreation in order to see how each is
shoring up the other in the same-sex marriage debate.
III.

SODOMY, MISCEGENATION, AND THE COUNTERFEITING
ANALOGY: HISTORY AND THEORY

Analogies between non-normative sexual practices and
subversive forms of commercial exchange have a history and a tradition
both in the law and outside of it. Understanding that history is
necessary for two reasons. First, it clarifies the procreation rationale for
same-sex marriage prohibitions and the role that procreation is playing
in the same-sex marriage debate today. Second, it explains how samesex marriage can properly be characterized as a variety of fraud in the
first place. The purpose of this Part is therefore to survey the history
and theory behind the counterfeiting analogy in different contexts in
order to provide a structure for Part IV, where I will discuss the work
that the procreation rationale, and counterfeiting rhetoric, is doing in the
contemporary same-sex marriage debate. In this sense, understanding
the history behind the counterfeiting analogy is indispensable to seeing
the extent to which history is repeating itself. For instance, and as I will
show, the portrayal of counterfeiters that appears in these sources reemerges, triumphantly, in Justice Scalia’s Romer v. Evans dissent and in
the legal debate over same-sex marriage—the latter of which is merely a
continuation of the former. Finally, in this Part I look to extra-legal
sources—e.g., Dante’s treatment of the counterfeiters in the Inferno—in
order to provide a “thicker” interpretation of the law’s current portrayal
of gays and lesbians in the marriage context. As such, this Part at least
theoretically relies on Professor Kenji Yoshino’s larger project in
36

Suspect Symbols, namely, the turning to literature, and literary
“symbols,” in order provide a “‘thicker’ response” to the procreation
rationale than “conventional” legal responses to that rationale have
afforded.120
Section A examines selected texts from the early-modern period
that describe sodomy and counterfeiting in analogous terms. Part IV
will use this history to argue that the procreation rationale reflects a
similar anxiety over sodomy as a fraudulent form of sexual exchange.
Section B examines the nineteenth-century deployment of counterfeiting
rhetoric to describe the ‘counterfeit’ product of that era’s signature nonnormative sexual relationship, miscegenation. Part IV will use the
miscegenation parallel to argue that the procreation rationale reflects a
similar anxiety over same-sex procreation as a counterfeit form of
exchange that allows the families of same-sex couples to “pass” for the
real thing.
A.

Sodomy and Counterfeiting

In November 2001, “homosexual activists” were accused of
“waging a war” against the Salvation Army (“Army”) when they
launched the “Queer Dollars Campaign” against that charitable
organization in Cleveland, Ohio.121 As a form of public protest against
the Army’s discriminatory employment policies toward sexual
orientation minorities in the areas of hiring and domestic-partner
benefits, LGBT activists from the Anti-Racist Action of Cleveland
deposited phony three-dollar bills into the Army’s kettles during its
annual drive—“queer” bills that contained the following slogan: “When
the Salvation Army ends its policy of religious bigotry against gay,
lesbian, bisexual and transgender people, then and only then will this be
a real dollar bill.”122 One website reported the incident with the
following headline: “Homosexuals Attack Salvation Army with
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Counterfeit Currency.”123
The symbolic protest undertaken by Cleveland’s Anti-Racist
Action was no doubt inspired by the slang phrase “queer as a three
dollar bill,” one whose origins may be traced back to the early-modern
association between “queer as homosexual activity” and “queer as
counterfeit money.” According to the Oxford Dictionary of Modern
Slang, two seemingly distinct—although, as I will show here,
conceptually related—definitions exist for the word “queer,”
specifically, “homosexual” and “counterfeit money.”124 The Dictionary
explains that the latter use of ‘queer-as-counterfeit’ derives from at least
the seventeenth century, when “counterfeiters” and “receivers of false
coins” were labeled “queere-cole-maker[s]” and “queer-cole-fencer[s],”
respectively.125 The Dictionary is silent, however, as to the etiology of
the former use of “queer as homosexual”—other than noting that this
particular slang version of “queer” exists. According to the more
comprehensive Oxford English Dictionary, however, the poet and
writer, W. H. Auden, was the first person to use “queer” in the sense of
“homosexual” in 1932.126 While both Oxford dictionaries therefore
observe the two-fold use of the word “queer” to denote counterfeiting
and homosexuality, neither appears to recognize its dual use as
signifying anything but a linguistic coincidence. That is, neither
dictionary accounts for a more comprehensive connection (or
interrelationship) between the subversive economic practice of
counterfeiting and homosexuality—or, perhaps more accurately, the
“utterly confused category”127 of sodomy that the latter has come to
represent.
Scholars of language and early-modern literature, however, have
suggested otherwise. They maintain that the use of “queer” to describe
both subversive economics and subversive sexuality is not adventitious.
Rather, “[q]ueer as homosexual appears to grow out of [ ] antecedent
coining terminology”; moreover, “[t]he modern usage might be traced to
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early sexological formulations in which homosexuality was seen as an
illegitimate, or counterfeit, imitation of heterosexuality.”128 In his
examination of the “historical overlapping of these seemingly distinct
queer discourses”129 during the early-modern period, Will Fisher
cogently demonstrates that “sodomy and counterfeiting were . . . united
conceptually long before the linguistic connection was established.”130
In
Fisher’s
view,
a
“particular
cultural
logic
131
. . . structures the connection between sodomy” and the economic
transgression of counterfeiting—the same logic that gave rise to the dual
use of “queer” in the first place. As another scholar of the early-modern
period has noted: “[t]he common denominator [between queer as
homosexual and queer as counterfeit] is difference, unnaturalness,
fraudulence; but within that thwarting of the straight, the signifier
‘queer’ shuttles between spheres of the material—money and
geometry—to more inchoate spheres of ethics and identity.”132
In order to understand the current formulation of same-sex
relations as counterfeit, then, it is necessary to understand the cultural
origins of the early-modern association between sodomy/homosexuality
and counterfeiting. At first blush, and using the analogy of “queer as a
three dollar bill” as our starting point, it would appear that the
association between ‘queer as homosexual’ and ‘queer as counterfeit’ is
descriptively inaccurate if it is intended merely to suggest that sexual
orientation minorities are deceptive in the same way that counterfeit
bills are deceptive. While this idea that sexual orientation minorities—
to whom the language of “passing” is applied no less than it is to
counterfeit currency—is no doubt behind the analogy between “queers”
and counterfeit, something else is doing the work to shore up the
“cultural logic” that unites counterfeiting and homosexuality. The slang
idiom “queer as a three dollar bill” cannot simply intend to cast the
“homosexual” as fraudulent in the sense of being deceptive because a
“queer three dollar bill” presents or announces itself as a fake by virtue
of the fact that it is, after all, a three dollar bill.133 For this reason, to
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accuse ‘homosexuals of attacking the Salvation Army with counterfeit
currency,’ as one website did, when LGBT activists deposited threedollar bills into the Salvation Army’s kettles is a curious—albeit
common—slip.
It is worth thinking about the conceptual relationship between
‘queer as homosexual’ and ‘queer as counterfeit’ not just in terms of
deceptive imitation—even though deceptive imitation is, as the next
Part shows, very much a concern for same-sex marriage opponents who
routinely talk about same-sex relations in the language of fraud. Rather,
we should think about this conceptual relationship in terms of the
intrinsically non-procreative sexual relations in which “queers” are
presumed to engage. This notion that sexual orientation minorities are
“queer as a three dollar bill” because they engage in non-procreative sex
not only links up with the ‘procreation as propagation’ rationale for
same-sex marriage prohibitions—insofar as that rationale rests on the
inability of a same-sex couple to cause sexual procreation—but also
explains at least part of what is driving the current analogy between
same-sex relations and counterfeiting. It also explains, as Part IV will
show, both the casting of ‘homosexuals’ in the contemporary same-sex
marriage debate and what is really behind the procreation rationale for
same-sex marriage prohibitions.
During the early-modern period, counterfeiting and sodomy
together figured as unnatural (and therefore “queer”) forms of nonprocreative exchange. Fisher has noted that a number of early-modern
texts conceptualize sodomy and counterfeiting in parallel terms. He
remarks that “[s]ometimes, the language of counterfeiting is used to
describe a sodomitical relationship . . . ; sometimes, the sodomite is
actually accused of making false coins . . . . In [these texts], sodomy and
counterfeiting are coterminous.”134 For instance, in Elizabeth Cary’s
The History of the Life, Reign, and Death of Edward II,135 written in
1680, the author describes the English King’s renowned “sodomitical”
tendencies in subversive numismatic terms.136 Cary relates that after
circulation in the early- to mid-nineteenth century. See Will Fisher, Queer Money, 66 ENGLISH
LITERARY HISTORY 1, 14 n.5 (1999); see also James R. Toland, Not-So-Phony $3 Bill, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON. 29 (Oct. 22, 1976).
134
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Edward sent Piers Galveston, the Duke of Cornwall and the King’s
alleged lover, away from the Court, the King’s “wandering eyes now
ravage[d] through the confines of the great Court, made loose by his
example. Here he seeks out some Piece, or Copper metal, whom by his
Royal stamp he might make current.”137 Fisher suggests that Cary’s use
of numismatic imagery in this passage—i.e., the ‘stamping’ of a
“Piece,” which was a “generic term for both coins . . . and sexual
objects,” as well as the allusion to “Copper metal,” which was
considered to be a “base metal that was specifically associated with the
anus”138—nicely conveys Edward’s equally injudicious social and
sexual transgression. He says:
[T]he King’s transgression here is not so much the
stamping itself, but rather the fact that the minion is not
of the proper mettle, or rank. Edward’s actions are
imagined as creating disorder because the base (whether
metal or man) is given preferment at the expense of the
noble. According to Cary, Edward makes base social
and sexual relations current in the court—the court is
said to be ‘made loose by his example’—just as he
makes base coins current in the realm.139
Cary therefore deploys the counterfeiting metaphor to suggest that the
King is engaging (or desires to engage) in a form of sexual exchange,
sodomy, that represents a perverse imitation of the ‘true’ and ‘natural’
form of “stamping” that characterizes both legitimate coining and
legitimate—i.e., procreative, heterosexual—sex.
The confluence of economic and sexual imagery that marks
Elizabeth Cary’s historical account of King Edward II similarly appears
in certain accusations that were hurled at the English playwright,
Christopher Marlowe, by the informer Richard Baines after the former
was arrested for atheism in 1593. In a note given to the Privy Council,
‘sin.’ Sir Thomas More recounts that the King was murdered with “a plumber’s iron, heated
intensely hot, [that] was introduced through a tube into his secret parts (into his anus) so that it
burned the inner portions beyond the intestines.”
137
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the group of advisors who worked closely with Queen Elizabeth, Baines
accused Marlowe of holding the following irreverent views with respect
to sodomy and counterfeiting, respectively: (1) that “St John the
Evangelist was bedfellow to Christ and leaned always in his bosome,
that he used him as the sinners of Sodoma”; and (2) that “he [Marlowe]
has as good Right to Coine as the Queen of
England, and that . . . he ment through help of a Cunninge stamp maker
to Coin french Crownes and English shillinges.”140
Baines’
characterization of Marlowe’s alleged suggestion that Christ and St.
John were lovers—and thus sinned in the manner of the “sinners of
Sodoma”—contains language reminiscent of monetary exchange, as “to
use” was a verb that denoted both expenditure and sexual intercourse
during the Elizabethan period.141 Conversely, Baines’ characterization
of Marlowe’s alleged counterfeiting scheme contains language
reminiscent of sexual exchange, as “to stamp” was a verb that denoted
both the minting of coins and procreative sexual intercourse—the irony
here, of course, being that Marlowe was allegedly promoting nonprocreative sexual acts.142 Baines’ accusatory testimony thus not only
suggests that Marlowe advocated both sodomy and counterfeiting, but
also describes Marlowe’s alleged sexual and economic crimes in
interchangeable terms.
Just as sodomy (and the sodomite) was figured in subversive
numismatic terms, so, too, was counterfeiting (and the counterfeiter)
figured in eroticized terms—or, at the very least, in terms that suggest
that counterfeiting was thought to be a sexualized sin or crime. One
English writer of the early seventeenth century recounts that the
punishment administered to counterfeiters during that time was to have
their “privy member . . . sundered from [their] body.”143 Another writer
from around that same time observes that the Normans reserved the
same punishment—that is, “cutting off . . . [the] genitals”—for “false
coyners.”144 In other words, the counterfeiter’s punishment rendered
140
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him sterile and thereby placed him in the same position of castrato that
the “homosexual” symbolically occupied. Moreover, from at least the
early thirteenth century, castration was also a common punishment in
several European countries for men who engaged in sodomy.145 Where
the sodomite’s punishment was intended to prevent him from having
penetrative sex, however, the counterfeiter’s punishment was intended
to prevent him “from sexually reproducing.”146 On a symbolic level, his
punishment “prevented him from breeding false coins.”147 Finally, “[a]s
the punishment demonstrates, counterfeiters were imagined to be male,
undoubtedly because the stamping involved in producing coins was
itself considered to be analogous to male penetration. According to this
logic, female stamping (and hence a female counterfeiter) is virtually
unthinkable.”148
It bears mentioning that Dante, the early-modern Italian poet,
chose an historical personage whose name is Master Adam to be his
representative counterfeiter in the Inferno’s eighth circle of Hell—the
circle where the fraudulent, including the counterfeiters, are punished.
A notorious counterfeiter of the Florentine florin who was burned alive
for his crime in 1281,149 Master Adam’s name surely evokes the
archetypal Adam whose sin was at once sexual and symbolically
economic: as Nietzsche reminds us, it is on account of this first man’s
sexual sin that humanity was forever cast into the position of a debtor
race charged with seeking spiritual redemption.150 Below, I will return
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145
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to Dante’s punishment of the counterfeiters that appears in Inferno 30 in
order to suggest a connection between the early-modern treatment of
counterfeiting/perverse sexuality and the current representation of
sexual orientation minorities by certain marriage traditionalists in the
same-sex marriage debate.
Based on these select early-modern sources, it would appear that
the early-modern mind conceptualized sodomy as a kind of
counterfeiting (and vice versa) for two interrelated reasons—each of
which highlights the non-procreative attributes of the former.
First, sodomy and counterfeiting together represented unnatural
and perverted imitations of production—biological reproduction and
economic/monetary production, respectively. If sodomy was unnatural
because it was a form of sex that took place outside the conventional
context of marital procreation, counterfeiting was unnatural because it
was a form of coining that took place outside the conventional context
of economic production. On a certain level, it made perfect sense for
early-modern writers to describe sodomy in subversive numismatic
terms, as the art of coining mimicked the biological, reproductive
process. The act of coining—which, as mentioned above, involved the
“stamping” or imprinting of the monarch on a piece of metal—was
“similar to the generational act as understood within Aristotelian
reproductive biology: the active male form impressing itself on female
matter.”151 Any “stamping” and generation of coins that occurred in the
absence of regal (and therefore divine) authority was therefore no less
perverse—and no more naturally procreative—than sodomy itself. Just
as the counterfeiter arrogated to himself the King’s (or the state’s)
prerogative of defining the manner in which money was ‘bred’ and thus
of ensuring the proper transmission of currency, the sodomite arrogated
to himself God’s (or Nature’s) prerogative of defining the manner in
which sex occurred and thus of ensuring the proper transmission of life.
Both the counterfeiter and the sodomite, then, not only disrespected
‘God’s process,’ so to speak, but also generated mere excess—the
counterfeit coin and non-procreative semen, respectively.
Second, sodomy and counterfeiting represented not only
beginning of the human race, about their ancestor who from now on is loaded down
with a curse (“Adam,” “original sin,” “no freedom for the will”) . . . .
Id.
151

Fisher, supra note _____, at 8.

44

uneconomical distortions of the natural procreative process, but also an
unnatural union and generation of similar (or externally identical)
entities: namely, two same-sex persons and counterfeit money,
respectively. For the early-modern—and, as Part IV demonstrates, the
contemporary—mind, same-sex relations and counterfeiting equally
represented a non-procreative, narcissistic, and avaricious passion for
sameness. Just as same-sex marriage opponents today have highlighted
the fraudulent aspects of joining together two identical identities that
cannot procreate,152 so, too, did early-modern thinkers conceptualize
counterfeiting as an unnatural breeding of the same and a narcissistic
obsession with the same.
At this point, I would like to return to Dante’s treatment of the
counterfeiters that appears in canto 30 of the Inferno—specifically, their
association with narcissism.
The symbolic representation of
counterfeiters that appears in that canto is instructive because it
highlights just that aspect of counterfeiting that often goes unnoticed—
namely, its narcissistic qualities—but that nonetheless renders it a
suitable analogy to same-sex relations in the eyes of same-sex marriage
opponents. As Part IV will explore at length, Dante’s suggestion that
sterile counterfeiters both generate and accumulate excess in a
narcissistic and avaricious manner corresponds to the contemporary
framing of sexual orientation minorities as an intra-relationally sterile
class that selfishly and narcissistically accumulates tangible resources
and economic power—and, for that reason, deserves less legal
protection than other minority groups. The twin images of the
‘homosexual as non-procreative sodomite’ and the ‘homosexual as
greedy narcissist’ not only figure prominently in Justice Scalia’s Romer
v. Evans dissent—where an image of the homosexual as counterfeiter
appeared for the first time in constitutional jurisprudence153—but also
play a dominant role in shoring up the procreation rationale for samesex marriage prohibitions today.
Dante’s allusion to two Ovidian figures who harbored an
unnatural obsession for similitude—Myrrha and Narcissus—in the same
152

See supra note _____, and accompanying text. One might also here recall Glen Lavy’s
statement that “[i]t takes sodium and chloride to make salt. If you add sodium to sodium, you
don’t have salt. If you add chloride to chloride, you don’t have salt . . . It takes a man and a
woman to make babies.” Supra note _____, and accompanying text.
153
See infra note _____ and accompanying text.

45

canto where he depicts the counterfeiters is surely no accident. Early in
canto 30, Dante is informed by one of the damned that Myrrha, Ovid’s
infamous daughter who tricked her father into having sex with her by
impersonating someone else, resides in the eighth circle of hell along
with the counterfeiters because she “contrived to sin with [her father]
. . ., counterfeiting in herself another’s person.”154 Later in that same
canto, Dante alludes to Narcissus when Master Adam tells another
falsifier, Sinon, who is parched with thirst, that “thou hast burning fever
and aching head and wouldst need little persuasion to lap Narcissus’
mirror.”155 Master Adam’s reference to “Narcissus’ mirror” is, of
course, an allusion to the legendary Greek youth who fell in love with
his own reflection and who was punished accordingly when the gods
turned him into the flower now known as the narcissus.
The allusions to Myrrha and Narcissus in a canto devoted to the
sins of counterfeiting specifically, and falsification more generally, are
neither casual nor gratuitous. Quite the contrary, Myrrha and Narcissus
epitomize the same unnatural sexual desire for—and cultivation of—
similitude that the sins (and crimes) of counterfeiting and homosexuality
symbolically represented. Myrrha’s incestuous desire for her father
places her in a position that corresponds to both the counterfeiter and
the sodomite, as her “counterfeiting” involves a non-normative sexual
relationship that not only conjoins two similar entities, but does so in a
way that is thought to pervert nature’s conventional procreative process.
As I have argued elsewhere, part of the reason why incest and
homosexuality are so often linked on the proverbial slippery slope ‘from
same-sex marriage to incest’156 is because an incestuous relationship is
like a same-sex relationship in this sense.
Similarly, Narcissus’ autoeroticism (and latent homosexuality)157
links him to the counterfeiters, sodomites, and incestuous in two related
ways: first, his unnatural desire for himself locks him into an entirely
self-reflexive mode of exchange; and second, that mode of exchange
represents a perversion—indeed, a refutation—of nature’s procreative
process. Ovid makes explicit that Narcissus’ flaw is at once a sexual
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and an economic one by using monetary language to characterize his
denial of the nymph, Echo, with whom he might have had a natural,
procreative sexual relationship. When Echo—whose fate of quite
literally becoming an echo ‘mirrors’ that of her beloved and involves a
replication of ‘the same’ that evokes all of the crimes here discussed—
beseeches Narcissus, Narcissus flees and says: “May I die before my
riches [copia] is yours.”158 Narcissus here uses the word “copia” to
convey the “riches” that he would like to keep for himself rather than
share with Echo; in so doing, Ovid suggests that Narcissus’ sexual
spurning of her is tantamount to a miserly and excessive accumulation
of wealth. The Latin word, “copia,” denotes abundance or plenty159 and
was the name given to the Roman goddess of abundance (Copia), who
was identified iconographically by her cornucopia, or horn of plenty—
the same horn that was imprinted on coinage during the reign of
Emperor Claudius II and that appeared in the hand of Aequitas, a minor
goddess of fair trade and honest merchants.160 Ovid’s use of this term
that both symbolically represented money and at one time appeared on
money nicely captures the veritable greed that self-love signifies.
Indeed, at the very moment that Narcissus realizes that it is himself with
whom he has fallen in love, he laments his fate by once again using the
language of copia: “What I desire, I have; the very abundance of my
riches beggars me [inopem me copia fecit].”161 Here, Ovid strategically
places two words that derive from the same root—“ops,” which means
riches, goods, abundance, or plenty162—in a chiastic poetic structure163
in order to convey the painful double bind in which Narcissus is
trapped: already possessing that which he cannot truly have. As I will
158
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show, the legal discourse surrounding same-sex marriage prohibitions,
as well as the procreation rationale for those prohibitions, place sexual
orientation minorities in this same double bind.
Ovid’s use of economic language to describe an erotic situation
that is at once non-procreative, miserly, and bankrupt did not escape the
attention of Dante, who was most certainly aware of the Roman poet’s
economic spin on the Greek legend when he chose to include Narcissus
among the counterfeiters in canto 30 of the Inferno. There is another
reason, however, why Dante likely found Narcissus to be a suitable
figure for a canto about falsification generally, and counterfeiting in
particular. Here, we must return to the language that Narcissus uses to
describe the paradoxical situation in which he finds himself. The same
Latin word that denotes material abundance, copia, also denotes a copy
or imitation—as the English “copy” derives from the Latin copia.164 In
this sense, Narcissus quite literally falls in love with a copy or
counterfeit of himself when he gazes admiringly upon his reflection in a
pool of water—a copia which, in turn, he keeps to himself rather than
exchange it with the outside world. Dante therefore intimates that those
who erotically desire a likeness or copy of themselves—Myrrha,
Narcissus, and the ‘homosexual’ that Narcissus symbolized for earlymodern readers165—are self-counterfeiting in a way that recalls the
counterfeiter’s unnatural and avaricious breeding of monetary copies.
Part IV will demonstrate that the current analogy between same-sex
relations and counterfeiting, as well as the procreation rationale itself,
similarly reflect a belief that gays and lesbians are ultimately sterile and
narcissistic—and, as such, uneconomical. Recent procreationist rhetoric
is therefore in some very real sense a case of Narcissus redux and of
history, and myth, repeating itself.
B.

Miscegenation and Counterfeiting

The current deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric in the same-sex
marriage debate also recalls the legal deployment of counterfeiting
language in the mid-nineteenth century to describe mixed-race
164
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individuals who passed for white. This historical parallel to the
contemporary framing of same-sex relations as counterfeit is useful
because it offers a way to connect miscegenation and same-sex marriage
on a substantive level in a way that the structural “miscegenation
analogy” to sexual orientation discrimination has largely overlooked.166
The miscegenation parallel, moreover, makes a great deal of sense in
this particular context by virtue of the fact that counterfeiting
terminology—“to pass counterfeit”—is implicit in the very language of
racial and sexual orientation passing. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, the act of deceiving another person with counterfeit is
technically referred to as “passing counterfeit” or “to pass
counterfeit.”167 The act of presenting oneself as white—or straight—to
the public is also, of course, routinely referred to as “passing.”168
Counterfeiting analogies appear in some nineteenth-century
cases to denote mixed-race passing as well as fugitive slaves who
escaped from a slave-holding into a free state. In one case, State v.
Anderson,169 the Supreme Court of Missouri considered whether the
court below erred when it allowed the jury in a rape prosecution to
determine the race of the victim, as well as the status and race of the
defendant, merely by looking at them in court and by hearing testimony
166
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that the latter was a slave. In that case, the defendant, “a negro slave,”
was indicted for “attempt[ing] to ravish a white female,” a crime that
carried higher penalties than had the defendant been, and the victim not
been, white. Although the defendant objected to the trial court’s jury
instructions—because they permitted the jury to determine the “color,
sex and race of the prosecuting witness and the defendant” merely on
the basis of sight and on proof that the defendant was a slave—the trial
court refused his objections and the jury returned a verdict of guilty and
a sentence of castration. In upholding the trial court’s ruling, the
Supreme Court of Missouri noted that the defendant’s attorneys made
the following argument on appeal:
The averments in the indictment, that the prosecutrix
was a white female, and the defendant a negro, were
material and had to be proved. The court erred in telling
the jury they might find that the prosecutrix was a white
female, from seeing her on the witness stand, and that
the defendant was a negro, from seeing him in court, and
proof that he was a slave. If this be law, then it would
be proper in a larceny case to instruct the jury that they
might find the material fact of value from seeing the
article, or in a case of passing counterfeit money, that
the money was counterfeit or genuine from seeing it in
court . . . . Under the statute, the question before the jury
was not merely one of color, but of race. Such questions
are often of the greatest difficulty, requiring for their
solution scientific skill. There are albinoes, mulattoes,
and quadroons, who excel Caucasians in whiteness of
skin. Yet, before the jury could convict the defendant, it
was necessary that they should find that he was a negro,
and the prosecutrix a Caucasian. These facts they could
only find upon proof. Slavery does not raise the legal
presumption of black color, although the converse is
true.170
It was therefore the defendant’s contention on appeal that, just as the
170
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state would have to prove that money was truly counterfeit before a jury
could find a defendant guilty of passing counterfeit money, so, too, must
the state prove, with “scientific skill,” that the defendant was truly
black. Perhaps more important, the state must also prove that the victim
was truly white—and not, like counterfeit money, someone (a “mulatto”
or a “quadroon”) who was passing for white.
Similar counterfeiting rhetoric appears in State v. Jacobs,171 in
which the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether a lower
court erred when it permitted a slave-owning witness to testify for the
state in a criminal case as an “expert” on “the effect of the intermixture
of negro or African blood with that of other races.”172 In that case, the
defendant was tried for carrying fire arms as a “free negro,” defined
statutorily as “one who is ‘descended from negro ancestors to the fourth
generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation may have
been a white person.’ He may, therefore, be a person who . . . has only a
sixteenth part of African blood in his veins.”173 To determine whether
the defendant was a “free negro” (or whether he was “white”) under the
statute, the prosecution called a witness to testify as an expert in “the
intermixture of negro or African blood with the white and Indian races,”
specifically, a slave owner who claimed expertise in “distinguish[ing]
between the descendants of a negro and a white person, and the
descendants of a negro and Indian; and further, [who claimed] that he
could . . . say whether a person was full African or negro, or had more or
less half negro or African blood in him.”174 To that end, the witness
testified that, in his opinion, “the defendant was what is called a
mulatto—that is, half African and half white,”175 and therefore a “free
negro” under the terms of the criminal statute.
In upholding the lower court’s decision to admit the testimony as
‘expert’ evidence,176 the Supreme Court of North Carolina remarked
that
it appears to be admitted, that the opinion of witnesses,
171

1859 WL 2024 (N.C. 1859).
Id. at *1.
173
Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
174
Id. at *1.
175
Id.
176
See id. at *2.
172

51

possessing peculiar skill, is admissible whenever the
subject matter of enquiry is such, that inexperienced
persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a
correct judgment upon it without such assistance. In
support of the principles thus announced, it has been
decided that seal-engravers may be called to give their
opinion upon an impression, whether it was made from
an original seal, or from another impression; . . . So, the
opinion of an artist in painting, is evidence of the
genuineness of a picture, . . . It has been said that the
genuineness of a post-mark may be proved by the
opinion of one who has been in the habit of receiving
letters with that mark . . . Merchants and bankers, who
are daily engaged in handling the notes of particular
banks, and have thus become thoroughly acquainted
with their whole appearance, may prove whether a
particular note is genuine or counterfeit . . . Many other
instances of the application of the principle might be
given, but those to which we have referred, are sufficient
to show that it is extensive enough to embrace the case
now before us. The effect of the intermixture of the
blood of different races of people, is surely a matter of
science, and may be learned by observation and study.
Nor does it require a distinguished comparative
anatomist to detect the admixture of the African or
Indian with the pure blood of the white race.177
Like the Anderson court, the Jacobs court analogized the “science” of
determining race—or, more specifically, the difference between
“admixture” and ‘purity’—to the science of determining the difference
between a genuine and a fraudulent banknote. In so doing, it suggested
that a mixed-race person that passed for a white person was tantamount
to a counterfeit note that passed for an authentic one.
The counterfeiting language that appears in these nineteenthcentury cases that struggled with the anxiety-provoking question of
racial purity—both in theory and in fact—is surely no accident, as the
177
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very crime of ‘passing’ counterfeit captured on a linguistic level what
was so disturbing about multi-racial passing on both an ideological and
a material level. Beyond the linguistic connection that counterfeiting
and multi-racial passing share, however, the idea that ‘non-whites’ were
analogous to fraudulent currency surely made sense to a legal (and
cultural) regime that treated non-whites as a form of property.178 In this
sense, the counterfeiting analogy to multi-racial passing was not just an
analogy but rather a different way of denoting the commercialization of
one’s personhood that the institution of slavery represented. Thus, it
was not at all strange for a federal district court in Pennsylvania to
reason that, under the United States Constitution, a slave owner from
one state had the right to recover his slave, who had absconded to
another state, by using “every art, device or stratagem to decoy the slave
into his power” because “[i]t is every day’s practice to detect
counterfeiters, and those who pass counterfeit money, by employing
persons to purchase it from them.”179 Here, the court’s characterization
of the plaintiff’s slave, who had temporarily taken up residence with the
defendant as “a runaway slave,”180 as counterfeit currency is not just
metaphorical. To the contrary, the slave, quite literally the property or
‘currency’—or, what historian Nell Irvin Painter has nicely termed the
“embodied currency”181—of the plaintiff-slave owner, is attempting to
self-counterfeit, or pass, as free in a way that would compromise the
plaintiff-slave owner’s aggregate wealth. The court therefore deployed
a commercial metaphor to capture the truly commercial interests that
were at stake in that case.
The historical analogy between counterfeiting and miscegenation
not only projected an image of the slave (or biracial person) as currency,
but also reflected a more deep-seated concern over the relationship
between money and racial equality. Historian Michael O’Malley has
explored the extent to which “[e]ssentialism—the search for
fundamental, intrinsic, ‘essential’ categories of being or laws of
nature—characterized much of nineteenth-century public discourse”
178
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surrounding race and money.182 O’Malley argues that the intense
anxiety over the production of greenbacks183 and similar “counterfeit”184
currency during both the Civil War and the Reconstruction period
reflected an anxiety over Northerners’ use of “greenback dollars to help
form biracial governments.”185 Critics of greenbacks often appealed to
the intrinsic worth of real money—namely, that which was tied to the
gold standard—of which greenbacks were an inferior substitute or
counterfeit, even though the latter were authorized by the federal
government.186 Critics of racial equality routinely used similar language
when appealing to the intrinsic worth of real ethnic identity—namely,
the white standard—of which the newly-freed slaves were thought to be
(by many) an inferior substitute or counterfeit, even though the latter
were rendered equal to whites (at least in name) by the Fourteenth
Amendment.187
Most interestingly, O’Malley observes not only that the two—
greenbacks and the newly-freed slaves—inspired similar fears over “the
instability of value and identity in American society,”188 but that those
fears were coterminous. Critics of greenbacks and racial equality
contended that the former would help to achieve the latter, even as the
value of both was derived through artificial means—namely,
congressional legislation and the Constitution, respectively. O’Malley
explains:
182
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Deploring greenbacks, Henry Adams called “the law of
legal tender . . . an attempt by artificial legislation to
make something true which was false.” Just as no legal
enactment could create value, no government could
affect the Negro’s nature. “No legislation of Congress
can elevate or improve the physical, moral or intellectual
condition of the negro,” maintained Senator George
Vickers of Maryland in 1869. “We cannot legislate into
them any fitness or qualifications which they do not now
possess.” . . . . [By contrast, f]rom the greenback
perspective, a legal declaration of equality, an
expression of political or cultural authority, could bring
about equality just as a congressional declaration of the
value of paper money could give the paper value.189
Similarly, “[g]reenbacks symbolized the power of government to
overturn the natural law arguments that justified slavery.”190 This
notion that the government cannot legislate ‘value’—be it of money or
of people—into existence was also behind the Supreme Court’s majority
opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, where the Court noted that “[l]egislation
is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based
on physical difference.”191 While the Fourteenth Amendment might
have granted Plessy legitimacy in the form of citizenship, and while
Plessy might have ‘passed’ for white, his ‘passing’ was deemed no more
legitimate than the passing of counterfeit currency.
Below, I will suggest that both counterfeiting rhetoric and the
procreation rationale are, on a symbolic level, repeating the history of
racial miscegenation. To be sure, same-sex marriage advocates, and
some courts, have long recognized the structural similarities between
race and sexual-orientation discrimination from a doctrinal
standpoint.192 Moreover, in some instances, the miscegenation analogy
189
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has proven quite successful as a litigation strategy.193 Nevertheless,
because commentators have focused almost exclusively on the
similarities between racial and sexual orientation discrimination, they
have missed the more substantive connections that exist between the
practice of miscegenation and same-sex procreation per se. The
following Part will suggest that courts are increasingly talking about
same-sex procreation as a kind of miscegenation unto itself. For this
reason, the miscegenation analogy offers a valuable way to understand
how same-sex marriage is a counterfeit and how the procreation
rationale operates to prevent marriage miscegenation.
IV.

THE LEGACY OF THE COUNTERFEITING ANALOGY IN THE
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE: NARCISSUS AND MISCEGENATION
REVISITED
How does the history behind the counterfeiting analogy help us
to understand the current deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric in the
same-sex marriage debate? More important, how does it clarify the
work that the procreation rationale is doing in shoring up same-sex
marriage prohibitions today? This Part explores and answers these
questions by looking more closely at the way in which history is
repeating itself on two levels. First, Section A uses the historical
casting of sodomy as counterfeit to explain why non-procreative sex is
such a concern for marriage traditionalists and for many courts, namely,
because it allows those who engage in ‘homosexual conduct’ to acquire
riches and political power that the rest of the population lacks. Because
same-sex couples therefore have more political clout, they need less by
way of legal protection. In this sense, same-sex couples are modern
avatars of Narcissus: simultaneously having too much and not enough.
Section B uses the historical casting of miscegenation as counterfeit to
explain why same-sex families are such a concern for marriage
traditionalists and for many courts, namely, because they attempt to
‘pass’ for the ‘real’ marriage archetype. In this sense, same-sex couples
193
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are repeating the crime of miscegenation: engaging in an artificial form
of procreation that attempts to pass itself off for the real thing.
A. The Power of Non-Procreative Sex: Narcissus Redux
The early-modern treatment of sodomy and counterfeiting (both
together and singly) helps to explain the contemporary framing of the
same-sex marriage debate as well as the legal treatment of same-sex
marriage prohibitions in at least three interrelated ways. I should note
here that I am not suggesting that either contemporary counterfeiting
rhetoric or the procreation rationale flow consciously and deliberately
from, say, Ovid and Dante. Rather, what I am suggesting is that the
counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale are better
understood in light of the ‘procreative’ logic that underlies both, and
that the early-modern treatment of sodomy and counterfeiting helps to
elucidate that logic. To return to Yoshino, the symbol of the
counterfeiter that emerges from Dante’s economic casting of the
Narcissus myth provides a “‘thicker’ response” to the procreation
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions than strictly ‘legal’
criticisms of that rationale have permitted.194
First, and as discussed at greater length above, sodomy and
counterfeiting were considered to be analogous modes of exchange that
did not follow nature’s/the state’s procreative process: if the latter
represented a perverse imitation of the way in which the state naturally
bred or ‘procreated’ currency, the former was arguably worse because it
did not guarantee any procreation even though it was an equally
perverse imitation of the way in which a cross-sex couple reproduced.
This early-modern notion that sodomy amounts to counterfeit because it
is non-procreative conforms to the contemporary framing of same-sex
marriage as counterfeit on account of the fact that it is not “inherently
procreative.”195 To recall the remarks of one same-sex marriage
opponent: “Same-sex marriages are counterfeit, immoral, totally sterile,
lacking the No. 1 reason for marriage—procreation—ignoring the
194
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wisdom of ages and common sense.”196
Second, and relatedly, the early-modern sources suggest that
non-procreative sodomy represented a threat to the continuity of the
state no less than counterfeiting represented a threat to the continuity of
the state’s currency. In his examination of sodomy and male
homosexuality in Renaissance England, Sodometries: Renaissance
Texts, Modern Sexualities, Jonathan Goldberg has observed that
“sodomy is, as a sexual act, anything that threatens alliance—any sexual
act, that is, that does not promote the aims of married procreative
sex.”197 Indeed,
[a]s the term [sodomy] was repeatedly invoked and came
to take on a whole variety of linked but distinct
meanings, those meanings always operated by an
analogy, however distant, to the original notion of the
sodomite as a destroyer of that most basic unit of the
social fabric, the procreative, married, heterosexual
couple.198
Early-modern sources therefore reveal not only the extent to which the
counterfeiting analogy reflects a fear about procreation, but also why the
non-procreative attributes of sodomy pose such a threat—namely,
because of their capacity to undermine “that most basic unit of the social
fabric, the procreative, married, heterosexual couple.”199 The
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions similarly rests
on this idea that same-sex relationships (and their intrinsic nonprocreativity) threaten to destroy this “most basic unit of the social
fabric.” As Justice Cordy reasoned in his Goodridge dissent: “[A]
society without the institution of marriage, in which heterosexual
intercourse, procreation, and child care are largely disconnected
processes, would be chaotic.”200
196
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Third, the early-modern notion that counterfeiters are
uneconomical narcissists conforms to the contemporary framing of gays
and lesbians as selfish and narcissistic because of the non-procreative
‘homosexual conduct’ in which they presumably engage. Rhetorical
and legal claims centering on the alleged narcissism and affluence of
gays and lesbians have assumed a variety of forms, some more
incendiary than others. For instance, sexual orientation minorities have
at times been accused of being narcissists (or narcissistic) because they
are thought to flout certain religious and moral tenets in favor of an
alternative “lifestyle” that runs directly counter to those tenets. As Pat
Robertson, founder of the Christian Coalition of America, recently
remarked: “[Homosexuals are] self-absorbed narcissists who are willing
to destroy any institution so long as they can have affirmation of their
lifestyle.”201 Or, in the words of the Family Research Council: “The
activist homosexual agenda and worldview are fundamentally
incompatible with Christianity or any form of true religion, because
homosexuality is ultimately narcissism. It denies the nature of our
bodies and the nature of our spirits.”202
More often than not, however, the language of narcissism and
avarice is less inflammatory and ironically appears to cast sexual
orientation minorities/same-sex couples in a positive light with respect
to their enhanced economic resources. Justice Scalia’s insistent focus in
his Romer v. Evans dissent on gays and lesbians’ so-called
“disproportionate political power” and “high disposable income”—the
former of which is likely a consequence of the latter, in his estimation,
and both of which militate against enhanced judicial protection for
sexual orientation minorities—evokes the early-modern image of the
sterile, narcissistic, and avaricious counterfeiter.203 In his words:
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The problem (a problem, that is, for those who wish to
retain social disapprobation of homosexuality) is that,
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend
to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain
communities, . . . have high disposable income, . . . and,
of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much
more ardently than the public at large, they possess
political power much greater than their numbers, both
locally and statewide. Quite understandably, they devote
this political power to achieving not merely a grudging
social toleration, but full social acceptance, of
homosexuality.”204
Justice Scalia here relies on what has come to be known as the “myth”
of gay affluence,205 that is, the widely-held belief that sexual orientation
minorities have more money and consequently more political power
than “the public at large”—the “public,” like the “seemingly tolerant
Coloradans” in Romer, whose “modest” attempts at lawmaking are
outweighed by the mobilization of a “politically powerful minority.”206
This myth of gay affluence or gay narcissism, which has enjoyed
some success in the courts,207 casts gays and lesbians in a role not unlike
that reserved for the early-modern counterfeiter. The myth not only
promotes the idea that sexual orientation minorities are greedy and
narcissistic as compared to the “modest” citizens who possess relatively
less political power and fewer resources, but also highlights the nonprocreative “homosexual conduct” in which they engage—the same
204
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non-procreative (read: counterfeit) conduct which, in turn, leads to the
selfish accumulation of wealth. More specifically, Justice Scalia
suggests that a causal link exists between sexual orientation minorities’
non-procreative “homosexual conduct” and their “high disposable
income”—resources surely not spent on any children born from a samesex relationship, but rather on political mobilization. In this sense, the
myth of gay affluence rests on the same logic as does the counterfeiting
analogy itself: sex that represents an uneconomical, narcissistic, and
non-procreative obsession with “copies” ironically generates financial
copia. In addition, and more interesting still, the myth of gay affluence
has been deployed in such a way so as to deprive sexual orientation
minorities of the benefit of heightened judicial scrutiny and therefore of
certain legal rights. Because ‘barren’ and ‘childless’ sexual orientation
minorities are presumed to possess more resources and political power
than other citizens, they ostensibly need less by way of legal protection.
The myth therefore places them in the same double bind in which
Narcissus, a symbolic counterfeiter, finds himself: possessing a surplus
of resources that renders them legally powerless.
Significantly, the myth of gay affluence/gay narcissism has
found its way into the more recent same-sex marriage cases as well as
the critical commentary surrounding the same-sex marriage debate.
While the language of narcissism that the myth inspires is not always
explicit in the cases and commentary, it nevertheless surfaces in the
following three ways.
First, states sometimes advert to the allegedly superior economic
position of same-sex couples relative to cross-sex couples in support of
their same-sex marriage prohibitions. For instance, in Goodridge, the
state attempted (unsuccessfully) to justify its same-sex marriage
prohibition by relying, in part, on a rationale that foregrounded gays and
lesbians’ ostensible economic surplus—a surplus which, in the state’s
view, entitled them to less protection. As the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts noted, “[t]he marriage restriction is rational, [the state]
argues, because the General Court logically could assume that same-sex
couples are more financially independent than married couples and thus
less needy of public marital benefits.”208
Second, the private welfare version of the procreation rationale
208
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assumes that same-sex couples possess an abundance of resources—
financial and otherwise—which allow them to engage in responsible
procreation. For instance, the Morrison court observed that same-sex
couples may become parents through “‘artificial’ reproduction methods
[which are] frequently costly and time-consuming.”209 In a footnote, the
court remarked that two women may reproduce by relying on in vitro
fertilization (IVF)—one cycle of which “has been estimated at
$12,400.”210 Alternatively, a same-sex couple may choose to adopt,
which costs “as much as $40,000 or more.”211 In other words, Morrison
recognized that artificial procreation is not only more responsible—but
more costly as well. Its analysis of that rationale rests on the
assumption that same-sex couples who are reproducing already possess
the financial resources to invest in child-bearing; for this reason, they do
not need marital rights. Once again, gays and lesbians are placed in a
situation where their non-procreative, ‘counterfeit’ sex guarantees them
riches (or copia) which, in turn, render them bereft of legal protection.
Third and last, critics of same-sex marriage have at times
adverted to the myth of gay affluence/gay narcissism in order to defend
a contrary position, namely, that same-sex couples should not be
awarded marital rights because they are not investing their resources in
having and raising children. Whereas the Morrison court at least
suggests that same-sex couples are overinvesting in child-bearing by
spending upwards of $12,400 for one IVF cycle (noting also that “it
frequently takes multiple cycles in order to succeed”212) or “as much as
$40,000 or more”213 to adopt, some opponents of same-sex marriage
have argued that same-sex couples underinvest because they allegedly
do not bear the costs of having and raising children. Under this view,
same-sex couples are hoarding their resources in a narcissistic and selfcentered way.
Professor Douglas Kmiec is one such exponent of the latter
view. In support of the ‘procreation as propagation’ rationale for samesex marriage prohibitions, Kmiec has recently likened all advocates of
same-sex marriage to the legendarily narcissistic Manichees, a third209
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century religious sect that
subscribed to the notion that human beings were sparks
of light or energy that were imprisoned by the created
world order. Good in a Manichean society took the form
of defying created human nature, including procreative
intercourse. The Manichees in essence taught that it was
salutary to hate one’s body. The Manichees not
surprisingly did not have a large impact upon the social
order of their time, or any other, but their selfcenteredness was certainly part of the Roman order,
which indulged numerous sexual practices, including
prostitution, homosexual relations, and masturbation.214
Furthermore, Kmiec has argued that it would be unfair to extend marital
rights to these ‘self-centered’ and ‘Manichean’ same-sex couples
because, in his view, they do not bear the financial responsibility of
raising children: “[T]oday, traditional parents make an investment of
over $200,000 (exclusive of college) to bring up a child to age 18, and
yet, they often receive the same economic benefits as those who do not
invest in raising children. Adding an increased number of childless
[married] homosexual partners to the mix makes matters worse.”215
Similarly, Professor George Dent has remarked that “[b]ecause gay
couples do not bear children . . . many gay marriages would be
marriages of convenience entered into primarily for the tangible
benefits.”216 Moreover, it is partly on account of the inherent ‘sterility’
of same-sex marriage that Dent has labeled that relationship “of
convenience” a “burlesque,” a “mere parody,” and a “caricature of the
real thing.”217 Where Morrison therefore sees surfeit (or overinvestment
in children), Kmiec and Dent see lack (or underinvestment in children).
Nevertheless, under both views, same-sex couples have too much to
spend in large part because they engage in a kind of sex whose non214
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procreative attributes allow for the disproportionate accumulation of
wealth—the “high disposable income” to which Justice Scalia alluded in
his Romer dissent.
When viewed through the lens of the counterfeiting trope and its
history, the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions is
in some very real sense repeating the history of sodomy regulation.
While the rhetorical strategies have shifted from disgust to counterfeit—
or what Didi Herman has termed a shift from a rhetoric of purity to a
rhetoric of pragmatism218—the underlying assumptions are the same. In
the current same-sex marriage debate, sexual orientation minorities do
not need the protections of the law because they engage in nonprocreative (and narcissistic) conduct that confers upon them monetary
privilege and power—the very same reasoning that largely fueled Justice
Scalia’s Romer dissent and traces of which appear in his Lawrence v.
Texas dissent.219 Given the history behind the counterfeiting trope and
its integral association with non-procreative sex, it is no surprise that an
image of the counterfeiter surfaces in these two dissenting opinions
which deal either implicitly or quite explicitly with same-sex conduct.
The early-modern image that perhaps best captures the extent to
which history is repeating itself (on many levels) is that of the usurer
with a mouthful of feces. While not a counterfeiter, the usurer—i.e., he
who lends money at interest—was nevertheless someone who, for the
early-modern mind, committed an economic crime (and sin) that
connected him to the sodomites and brought him within sodomy’s
ambit. The early-modern association between usury and sodomy
followed from Aristotle, for whom usury was “the birth of money from
money” and “of all modes of making money . . . the most unnatural.”220
Strange bedfellows, the usurers and the sodomites had one thing in
common: they both generated excess through unnatural means. Where
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the sodomite produced and exchanged semen in a non-reproductive
way, the usurer produced and exchanged money in a legendarily
unnatural way—as his riches increased purely by dint of interest rather
than by dint of investment.221 In a sense, the usurer was the inverse of
the sodomite: where the former turned an otherwise sterile product
(money) into something fruitful, the latter turned an otherwise fruitful
product (semen) into something sterile. Nevertheless, and not
coincidentally, Dante places the usurers and the sodomites together in
the same level of hell above the counterfeiters, where they are punished
for violating “Nature” and “God’s art,” respectively, and
where they both reside on a burning plain—an image of the sterility that
marks their unnatural economic and sexual activity.222
Medieval historian, Jacques Le Goff, describes the image of the
usurer that appears in the fresco of Hell in the Collegiate Church of San
Gimignano, Italy, as someone who is orally ingesting the devil’s
excrement—excrement which turns out to be gold coins—and who is
placed alongside a sodomite who is himself orally ingesting semen.223
The image of the usurer with a mouth laden with the devil’s excrement
recalls the image of the ‘feces-eating’ homosexual that surfaced in the
rhetorical campaign surrounding the passage of Colorado’s Amendment
2224—an image that at least implicitly appears in Justice Scalia’s Romer
dissent, which at once highlights homosexual conduct (feces ‘eating’)
and homosexual power (coin collecting). It also conveys the disgust
that we might feel when in the company of a swindler—thus explaining
the modern slang that we use to describe someone who is, in Professor
William Ian Miller’s words, “faking it.”225 (It also explains, at least in
part, why Leon Kass has characterized the duplicative—and
duplicitous—reproductive practice of cloning as “repugnant”).226 More
than this, the image of the commercial fraudster full of feces (and placed
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next to a sodomite) perfectly captures the Janus-faced discourse that has
marked the construction of sexual orientation minorities in the law over
the last ten years: a class whose non-procreative activity renders it at
once a source of disgust and a paradigm of fraud—or, perhaps more
accurately, a class whose non-procreative fraud inspires disgust.
However we flip the proverbial coin, the history behind the association
between abnormal sexuality and economic fraud—as well as the
resurgence of that history in the same-sex marriage debate—brings us
back full circle to sodomy and its non-procreative attributes.
B. Marriage Miscegenation
The historical analogy between miscegenation and counterfeiting
helps to explain the more recent, private welfare version of the
procreation rationale—one that has stumped commentators, and some
judges, because it ironically places same-sex couples in a superior
position relative to their cross-sex counterparts. Indeed, how might we
explain the tortured logic that assumes that same-sex couples do not
need the protections of the law because they are better than straight
couples when it comes to having children? The Narcissus myth and the
double bind it projects already supplies us with one answer, namely,
same-sex couples do not need the protections of the law because they
already have monetary power and the privileges that flow from it. The
miscegenation analogy, however, supplies us with a better answer,
namely, same-sex couples and the superior form of procreation in which
they engage is allowing them to look too much like the cross-sex family
paradigm. As such, the procreation rationale increasingly functions to
prevent marriage-miscegenation and same-sex marriage passing.
Part I argued that the more recent version of the procreation
rationale reflects an implicit fear of the reality of same-sex procreation.
While some courts have continued to emphasize the extent to which
same-sex reproduction is different from the cross-sex paradigm,227 most
courts that have upheld same-sex marriage prohibitions on the basis of
227
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this rationale are increasingly recognizing that same-sex couples are
reproducing and having families through asexual means. In Hernandez,
for example, the lower court stated that “the reality is that significant
numbers of couples in New York have formed same-sex families, and
numerous couples will continue to do so, whether they are allowed to
marry or not.”228 Even those courts that have upheld same-sex marriage
prohibitions on the basis of encouraging responsible procreation have
recognized the reality of same-sex families. In Standhardt, for instance,
the court recognized that “some same-sex couples also raise children,”
even as it concluded that the “exclusion of these couples from the
marriage relationship does not defeat the reasonableness of the link
between opposite-sex marriage, procreation, and child-rearing.”229
Similarly, in Lewis v. Harris, in which the New Jersey Superior Court
upheld that state’s same-sex marriage prohibition partly on the basis of
procreation, Judge Collester, in dissent, stated bluntly that “[t]he fact is
some persons in committed same-sex relationships can and do legally
and functionally procreate . . . [The plaintiffs] in this case . . . each gave
birth to their children following artificial insemination.”230 The very
thing that rendered same- and cross-sex partners intrinsically different
and that justified differential treatment of those two classes from a
constitutional perspective in the early same-sex marriage cases—the
ability to procreate—is the same thing that is starting to bridge the gap
between them.
A burgeoning anxiety that same-sex families are beginning to
look too much like, and therefore passing as, the cross-sex family
paradigm has accompanied the courts’ (and the public’s) increased
awareness of the reality of same-sex procreation. Such a fear is
reflected in contemporary counterfeiting rhetoric and the emphasis that
it often places on deceptive imitation—for instance, Robert Knight’s
remarks that “if [same-sex partnerships are] called marriage, it’s a
counterfeit version. And counterfeit versions drive out the real
thing.”231 Such a fear is also reflected in the private welfare procreation
rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions. Because the private
228
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welfare procreation rationale captures the reality that same-sex couples
are reproducing, it raises the specter that they are, or at least might be,
passing for ‘real’ families.
As mentioned, the private welfare procreation rationale
sometimes casts same-sex procreation as a better version or product
than its cross-sex counterpart. For instance, while the Morrison court
remarked in a footnote that the methods of same-sex child-bearing—
artificial reproduction and adoption—involve significant costs, it also
implied that the couples who avail themselves of such methods might be
better parents because of their substantial investment ex ante:
Those persons who have invested the significant time,
effort, and expense associated with assisted reproduction
or adoption may be seen as very likely to be able to
provide [a stable environment for children], with or
without the “protections” of marriage, because of the
high level of financial and emotional commitment
exerted in conceiving or adopting a child or children in
the first place.232
Once again, same-sex couples need less (legal protection) because they
have invested more (financial and emotional resources). What is most
interesting here from the perspective of the counterfeiting analogy to
same-sex relations, however, is the suggestion that the “artificial”
reproductive imitation (or counterfeit) has not diluted or devalued the
real thing but rather surpassed it. When viewed in this light, the
counterfeit is not a counterfeit at all but rather a completely new (and
better) product. The Morrison court’s explicit casting of same-sex
reproduction as an “artificial” imitation that is better than the “natural”
paradigm—an image of procreation that has appeared in other cases that
have upheld same-sex marriage prohibitions on the basis of this
rationale233—thus ironically conflicts with the image of same-sex
reproduction that emerges from counterfeiting rhetoric more generally:
namely, an unworthy replica of the real thing.
At the same time, however, the private welfare rationale also
232
233
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works in concert with the notion that same-sex marriage not only is a
degraded form of the real thing, but also devalues the real thing. For
instance, in Lewis, the New Jersey Superior Court upheld that state’s
same-sex marriage prohibition by adverting, in part, to the rational basis
of encouraging responsible procreation—even though, it bears noting,
the Attorney General of New Jersey “disclaim[ed] the promotion of
procreation as a rationale for prohibiting same-sex marriage.”234 In so
doing, a concurring opinion remarked that the most “vital” purpose of
marriage is “to control or ameliorate [procreation’s] consequences—the
so-called ‘private welfare’ purpose.”235 The opinion went on to suggest
that it is this procreative function of cross-sex marriage that renders that
relationship “meaningful” and that confers upon it a “‘specialness’” that
same-sex marriage (and the artificial reproduction that may occur within
that context) lacks.236 Under this view, cross-sex marriage derives its
uniqueness by virtue of the kind of procreation that it both guarantees
and protects. Procreation is no longer about propagation of the species
but rather about preserving the uniqueness of the relationship in which it
ideally occurs.
Moreover, and as the opinion further notes, it would dilute the
distinctiveness of the original marital model to recognize relationships
where procreation does not occur between two unrelated, cross-sex
individuals. Perhaps speculating on the substance of those “other
reasons . . . to promote the institution of marriage” to which Justice
O’Connor alluded in her Lawrence v. Texas concurrence,237 the Lewis
concurrence stated that “there are reasons for limiting unfettered access
to marriage. Otherwise, by allowing the multiplicity of human choices
that bear no resemblance to marriage to qualify, the institution would
become non-recognizable and unable to perform its vital function [of
controlling or ameliorating the consequences of cross-sex
procreation].”238 By preserving the unique and ‘special’ connection that
exists among marriage, cross-sex intercourse, and procreation, the
234
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private welfare rationale thus ensures that a marriage copy—a statesanctioned relationship, for example, where procreation between two
people does not occur through sexual means—does not render the
original on which it is based “non-recognizable.” Instead of ensuring
the continuation of society, procreation is now being deployed to ensure
the continuation of marriage. Sexual procreation no longer figures as a
necessary condition of marriage. Rather, marriage is a necessary
condition of sexual procreation—and only sexual procreation.
The emphasis here placed on the uniqueness of cross-sex
procreation (within the marital context) invites us to consider same-sex
procreation as an artificial counterfeit of the former that devalues—and
dilutes—it in the process of imitating it. The language that the
concurring opinion uses to describe what would happen were the state to
recognize a form of marriage that does not promote the “vital purpose”
of encouraging responsible procreation reflects a situation analogous to
the introduction of counterfeit currency into the market. Specifically,
the recognition of same-sex marriage would cause the uniqueness of the
“institution” of marriage to fade—“to become non-recognizable and
unable to perform its vital function”—in a way that recalls the power of
a counterfeit to compromise the distinctiveness and efficacy of the real
thing.
If we push the counterfeiting analogy a bit further, however, the
concurring opinion’s fear that artificial substitutes that “bear no
resemblance” to marriage will render marriage less distinctive makes
no more sense than does the counterfeiting analogy to civil unions and
same-sex marriage. As Part II.B queried, if civil unions are not called
marriage, and if same-sex marriage is legally the same as cross-sex
marriage, then how do civil unions and same-sex marriage operate as
counterfeit? So, too, here: if same-sex marriage truly “bears no
resemblance to [cross-sex] marriage,” then how could it possibly render
that archetypal institution “non-recognizable”? Put another way, how
does an imitation pass for—and, in the process, dilute—an original if it
is not really an imitation at all?
The historical linking of counterfeiting and miscegenation
surveyed in Part III offers a way to understand just what is going on in
the Lewis concurrence and what is really behind the procreative fear that
it projects. Nineteenth-century counterfeiting rhetoric captured, in part,
what was so threatening about the consequences of miscegenation—
70

namely, the creation of an individual (like Homer Plessy) who, in the
eyes of essentialists, did not bear any resemblance to a white man but
who was nevertheless qualifying (or passing) as one. In the process, the
value of ‘whiteness’ became “non-recognizable and unable to perform
its vital function” of maintaining racial hierarchy. The irony, of course,
is that Homer Plessy did resemble the white man whom he was, in the
eyes of essentialists, trying to imitate because Homer Plessy was, in fact,
biracial. The point here is that traditional marriage in the Lewis
concurrence—and in the eyes of marriage traditionalists more
generally—assumes the same position that whiteness did for nineteenthcentury essentialists.
Like ethnic miscegenation, ‘marriage
miscegenation’ produces copies that pass for the real thing—and, in the
process, render the real thing less distinctive. In recognizing the reality
of same-sex procreation and the danger that it poses, the private welfare
rationale therefore acts as ‘barrier’ that prevents marriage-mixing. It is
for precisely this reason that the Lewis concurrence also remarks that the
state must “draw[] principled boundaries”239 around the traditional
institution of marriage in order to preserve its unique, procreative
function.
I would like to conclude here by briefly offering two additional
reasons for why the miscegenation analogy to same-sex marriage makes
sense on a more substantive level—each of which returns to the
counterfeiting analogy. First, marriage traditionalists have deployed
counterfeiting rhetoric in the same-sex marriage debate in a way that is
uniquely tied to an anxiety over subversive and deceptive reproduction.
As Part II set forth at length, lawmakers and same-sex marriage
opponents label same-sex couples as counterfeit in large part because
they engage in non-procreative sex that mimics the real thing and
because they produce families that attempt to pass for the real thing. It
is surely no coincidence that opponents of reproductive cloning, a
prospective practice that is routinely characterized as deceptive and
fraudulent—and, as with same-sex relationships, repugnant because it is
deceptive and fraudulent240—associate that technology specifically with
same-sex couples.241 Cloning represents just those aspects of same-sex
239
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procreation that are most threatening—i.e., a narcissistic obsession with
the same, the deceptive reproduction of the same—writ large.
Similar reproductive concerns, of course, inspired lawmakers to
criminalize miscegenation. In Loving v. Virginia, the state of Virginia
argued, and the Appeals court agreed, that its criminal antimiscegenation statute was necessary in order to prevent a “mongrel
breed of citizens.”242 In State v. Jackson, the Supreme Court of
Missouri went so far as to claim that miscegenation, like sodomy,
defeated procreation. As the court stated: “It is stated as a well
authenticated fact that if the issue of a black man and a white woman,
and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly
have any progeny.”243 Although miscegenation was, historically, a
reproductive ‘practice’ that represented the mixing of two entities that
were not too alike but rather too different, it nevertheless equally
signified an illegitimate (and therefore counterfeit) form of
reproduction.
For instance, a colonial law that prevented
“intermarriage” between blacks and whites in Massachusetts, entitled
“An Act for the Better Preventing of a Spurious and Mixed Issue,”244
highlighted just this deceptiveness of mixed-race reproduction. Like
today, in 1705 “spurious” denoted “a sham or a counterfeit” as well as
non-marital progeny.245
Second, the nineteenth-century anxiety that surrounded
counterfeit (or greenback) currency, racial equality, and the “artificial
legislation” that would ostensibly guarantee both finds its counterpart in
the recent anxiety over same-sex marriage. Not only is same-sex
marriage, like mixed-race persons and newly-freed slaves,
conceptualized in terms of counterfeit, but both the rhetoric and the
legal analysis that often surrounds same-sex marriage highlights the fact
that the law simply cannot change what is the ‘naturally given’ marital
paradigm. Same-sex marriage opponents routinely invoke natural law
arguments to justify both what the current legal regime is and should
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be.246 Moreover, like the nineteenth-century essentialists, they also
suggest that a positive law that recognizes same-sex marriage is (or
would be) fraudulent because it contravenes natural law. It is for
precisely this reason that Professor Wardle has suggested that “a state
that confers the legal status of marriage upon same-sex unions commits
fraud when it presents a false image of same-sex unions as comparable
to traditional marriage.”247 The Concerned Women for America
expressed a similar concern when it remarked that the original Federal
Marriage Amendment as drafted “would result in legalized counterfeit
marriage”248—relying on the oxymoronic phrase, “legalized
counterfeit,” to highlight the state’s role in perpetrating a fraud upon the
public.249 Under these views, a legal regime that condones same-sex
marriage passing is no less fraudulent than the counterfeiter herself.250
V.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND QUEERING THE DOUBLE
BIND

This Article has shown that the counterfeiting trope is
descriptively inaccurate as applied to same-sex relationships: same-sex
marriage is, quite simply, not a counterfeit. At the same time, however,
this Article has also shown that the counterfeiting trope makes sense in
light of its history: same-sex marriage is, in fact, a counterfeit for the
same reasons that both sodomy and miscegenation once were (and, in
the case of sodomy, continues to be). Having surveyed the history
behind counterfeiting rhetoric and used that history to explain the
246
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procreation rationale, Part V now turns to a more normative critique of
counterfeiting rhetoric and to the future. My objective in this Part is
twofold. Section A demonstrates that counterfeiting rhetoric—like the
law more generally—continues to place sexual orientation minorities in
a double bind in precisely that area of the law, domestic relations, where
the double bind has operated to deny that group a panoply of rights.
Section B, which is more prospective in purpose and scope, proposes
what a “queer” reading of the ‘queer as counterfeit’ analogy might look
like.
A. Counterfeit,

Imitation,

and

the

Double

Bind

The counterfeiting analogy to same-sex relationships warrants
criticism for three reasons. First, and most obvious, same-sex
relationships are not deceptive on their face. Second, that analogy
continues to place gays and lesbians in a pernicious double bind. Third,
and relatedly, that analogy perpetuates the discourse of fraud that has
surrounded the legal construction of sexual orientation minorities for
centuries. Remarkably, even some feminist lesbian theorists who
believe that marriage is not “a path to liberation” for sexual orientation
minorities251 have characterized same-sex marriage as a kind of
imitation—albeit the imitation not of a superior product, but of an
intrinsically flawed institution that perpetuates gender discrimination
and heterosexist assumptions. Professor Nancy Polikoff, for instance,
has remarked that “I believe that the desire to marry in the lesbian and
gay community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society,
an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays the
promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism.”252
Polikoff is not alone among gay and lesbian theorists in advocating that
the queer community shift its focus from the “unacceptably
conservative” prospect of marriage to more “progressive” social
concerns—concerns like universal healthcare “regardless of marital
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status.”253 Nevertheless, her characterization of gays and lesbians’
desire to marry as a kind of mimicry in and of itself is noteworthy
because it suggests that even those who would likely take issue with the
conservative casting of same-sex marriage as counterfeit are thinking
about same-sex marriage in terms of deceptive impersonation.
The language of mimicry and counterfeiting which has
pervaded the same-sex marriage debate—on both sides—perpetuates the
double bind in which the law routinely places sexual orientation
minorities. Counterfeiting rhetoric, along with the procreation rationale,
places queers in a number of double binds. For instance, by depicting
‘selfish’ sexual orientation minorities as at once having an
overabundance of economic capital (i.e., tangible resources) and a
dearth of procreative capital (i.e., the ability to have true riches in the
form of children), counterfeiting rhetoric places them in the impossible
position of having too much and not enough. Similarly, by at once
emphasizing that same-sex couples cannot have children through sexual
means and that they can bear children in a more responsible manner, the
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions places queers
in the hopeless position of: (1) being thought of as both sterile (intrarelationally speaking) and procreative (extra-relationally speaking); and
(2) being both inferior and superior to their cross-sex counterparts in
terms of procreative ability. In this sense, the evolution of the
procreation rationale itself perpetuates the double bind that
counterfeiting rhetoric reflects.
The idea, though, that sexual orientation minorities are
deceptive because they are attempting to mimic (and pass for) married,
cross-sex couples and their families helps to perpetuate yet another
double bind—one that has functioned most vigorously in the family law
context. The law routinely requires gay and lesbian parents to cover
their sexual identity—or, more drastic, to pass as straight—should they
desire to retain even limited custodial or visitation rights over their
children. While a ‘homosexual’ sexual orientation operates as a per se
253
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bar on custody and/or visitation in only a minority of jurisdictions,254
homosexual ‘conduct’ that occurs in the presence of children—
including, but not limited to, displays of affection between same-sex
partners—continues to operate as a significant factor in custodial and
visitation decisions in a majority of jurisdictions.255 As Yoshino has
observed, most courts not only regularly penalize gay and lesbian
parents for failing to cover, but some courts have even “articulated a
standard that suggests that the [gay or lesbian] parent must convert.”256
In the custodial and visitation context, then, gay and lesbian parents are
effectively required to self-counterfeit—that is, required to assume the
very traits or qualities of mimicry and counterfeit that same-sex
marriage opponents appear to despise most.
Moreover, in some jurisdictions, same-sex parents (or single
gays and lesbians) are ineligible to adopt because they cannot “pass” for
cross-sex parents. For instance, in In the Matter of the Adoption of:
Charles B., the Court of Appeals of Ohio found that “homosexuals”
were barred from adopting under that state’s adoption law even though
sexual orientation did not operate as an explicit statutory bar to
adoption.257 In refusing “[t]o impute to the legislature . . . an intention
to make homosexuals eligible to adopt,”258 the court invoked the very
language of passing to express its belief that gay parents could not
“imitate” and “pass for” cross-sex families because “homosexuals”
could not sexually procreate:
Homosexuality negates procreation.
Announced
homosexuality defeats the goals of adoption. It will be
impossible for the child to pass as the natural child of
the adoptive “family” or to adapt to the community by
quietly blending in free from controversy and stigma. A
principle inherent in adoption since Roman days is
254
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“adoptio naturam imitatur,” adoption imitates nature.
The fundamental rationale for adoption is to provide a
child with the closest approximation to a birth family
that is available.259
More recently, in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and
Family Services, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Florida’s law that
prohibited “homosexual” persons from adopting partly on the rational
basis that adoptive households should “resemble the nuclear family as
closely as possible.”260
The criticism that same-sex couples are unable to pass (or
cover) that emerges from these cases conflicts with the more general
criticism that sexual orientation minorities are deceptive because they
do often pass (or cover). For instance, in Weigand v. Houghton, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a lower court’s decision refusing a
gay father’s petition for custody partly on the basis that the father did
not engage in “open sign[s] of affection” with his partner in front of his
child; rather, the father “merely retreat[ed] behind closed and locked
door, hiding and secreting his own sexuality from Paul.”261 While
Yoshino reads the Wiegand court’s statement as a covering demand that
is “tantamount to a demand for conversion,”262 we might also read it as
a criticism that rests on the father’s deceptiveness and that at least
implies that he is being dishonest by “hiding and secreting” his
authentic self and instead impersonating someone else in front of his
son. Of course, if the father did not engage in this kind of selfcounterfeiting, the court would likely have found that he was not
covering enough. Suffice it to say here, though, that as with the
deployment of counterfeiting rhetoric (or the language of mimicry more
generally) by opponents of same-sex marriage, the judicial treatment of
gay and lesbian parents in the custodial context perpetuates a double
bind that casts sexual orientation minorities as both fraudulent (i.e.,
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attempting to pass) and not fraudulent enough (i.e., refusing or being
unable to pass).
B.

Queering the Double Bind

Is there a way to recast the counterfeiting analogy to same-sex
relationships—and the freight of negative connotations that the very
term, “counterfeit,” bears—in a positive way and put it to constructive
use? In a sense, the protestors who launched the Queer Dollars
Campaign in Cleveland have done precisely that by co-opting the very
stereotype of ‘queer as counterfeit’ and turning it back on itself as a
form of political protest. That is, the Queer Dollars Campaign quite
literally returned the pejorative ‘queer as counterfeit’ metaphor or
trope—the latter of which denotes the turning away of a word from its
original meaning263—back to its origins. On a certain level, the
Campaign’s political strategy was quite ingenious: at the same time that
the queer activists were announcing or revealing themselves as “queer”
in the sense of counterfeit, they were symbolically passing “queer” or
counterfeit currency. Their strategy therefore involved a simultaneous
process of ‘outing’—outing themselves as well as the origins of the very
stereotype that they were enacting—and ‘passing.’ But the Campaign
took it one step further still: by publicly staging or performing what is
typically considered to be a deceptive act of passing—be it the passing
of counterfeit currency or the passing of one’s sexual identity—the
activists were undoing the very act that gave rise to the ‘queer as
counterfeit’ stereotype in the first instance.
In his seminal piece on covering, Professor Yoshino chooses
“the word ‘queer’ to denominate ‘gays who refuse to cover,’” that is, to
downplay their sexual identity.264 While noting that such a definition
“represent[s] precisely the essentialization of sexual identity that [queer
theorists] resist,”265 Yoshino nevertheless observes that “[i]n popular
parlance, . . . the perception that ‘queers’ are gays who refuse to cover is
common, not least because normals have cast them in these terms.”266
263
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Yoshino’s definition of “queer” is noteworthy and of particular
relevance here because it highlights an additional aspect of the ‘queer as
counterfeit’ analogy that this Article has not discussed but that inheres
in the very idea of a “queer” three dollar bill, namely, the fact that
“queer” connotes something that is “strange” or “unusual”267—that is,
something whose eccentricity and deviation from the norm (say, a one
or a five dollar bill) calls attention to itself. Earlier I suggested that the
slang phrase, “queer as a three dollar bill,” cannot simply convey
counterfeit in the sense of deceptive because everybody knows that a
three dollar bill is a fake when they see one.268 Part of what makes
“queers” different from “normals,” it would seem, is that their “refusal
to cover” is accompanied by a sense that they are flaunting their socalled deviation from the norm and thereby forcing the public to take
account of the fact that they are three dollar bills. At first blush, then,
these two senses of queer—queer as counterfeit and queer as strange—
are in disharmony and appear to perpetuate the double bind in which
sexual orientation minorities are routinely placed: whereas the former
sense of queer connotes covert deception (i.e., passing and/or covering),
the latter sense of queer connotes visible difference (i.e., outing and/or
flaunting).
The Queer Dollars Campaign’s activists, however, effectively
played on this disharmony (or dual sense of queer) by publicly
foregrounding an identity that is routinely cast in deceptive, ‘counterfeit’
terms. Their public staging and performative recasting of the ‘queer as
counterfeit’ trope represents an example of what queer theorist, Judith
Butler, might call ‘parodic performativity,’ that is, the process by which
ostensibly essential, ontological categories like “sex and gender [are]
denaturalized by means of a performance which avows their distinctness
and dramatizes the cultural mechanism of their fabricated identity.”269
Butler’s classic example of parodic performativity is drag, which, she
suggests, complicates “the relation between the ‘imitation’ and the
‘original’ by “play[ing] upon the distinction between the anatomy of the
performer and the gender that is being performed.”270 Moreover, “[i]n
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imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of
gender itself—as well as its contingency.”271 In a similar vein,
postmodern theorist, Jean Baudrillard, contends that an imitation or
copy of an archetypal model has the power to displace the ontological
primacy and basis of that model. In Simulacra and Simulation,
Baudrillard writes that a simulation (i.e., an image or imitation) of
reality (i.e., an ‘original’ form) undergoes a four-step process whereby it
(1) “reflect[s] a profound reality;” (2) “masks and denatures a profound
reality;” (3) “masks the absence of a profound reality;” and (4) “has no
relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum.”272
Baudrillard’s theory of simulation—and the simulacra that simulation
produces—recalls Butler’s theory of the process by which drag (and
other varieties of parodic performance) reveals not only the “absence” of
the “reality” of sex and gender, but their imitative structure as well.
How might Butler and Baudrillard’s respective theories of
performative imitation and simulation—each of which is far more
comprehensive than my cursory analysis here permits—supply us with a
lens through which to consider the productive possibilities of the
counterfeiting analogy to same-sex relations? Fortunately, the Queer
Dollars Campaign has already provided us with an instance where the
queer and postmodern theories casually discussed here have been put
into practice. Where same-sex marriage opponents, commentators like
Professor Dent, and even some radical queer theorists regard same-sex
marriage as mimicry, fraudulent, a counterfeit, a “mocking burlesque,” a
“mere parody,” and a “caricature of the real thing,”273 the Queer Dollars
Campaign’s queer activists understood the fertile, performative
possibilities of that very “counterfeit” or “parody.” Moreover, where
the Queer Dollars Campaign performatively enacted (and, in the
process, ‘undid’) the double bind of the “queer as a three dollar bill”
counterfeiting trope, we might imagine a situation where the
counterfeiting trope that has been applied to same-sex marriage (and
same-sex reproduction) might similarly be turned on itself. Perhaps
queer activists might publicly stage a wedding while putting counterfeit
dollars into the Salvation Army’s kettles—revealing that marriage, like
271

Id. (italics in original).
JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION 6 (trans. Shelia Faria Glaser) (1995)
(italics in original).
273
See Dent, supra note ____, at 424.
272

80

money, is an eminently imitable construct that earns its legitimacy from
the law that ‘so orders’ it. Marriage—like sex, gender, whiteness—
might emerge as no more naturally given than the counterfeiting rhetoric
that supports it. To mimic marriage in this way is not to suggest that
marriage is a bad thing or that queer activists should refocus their
energies on less “conservative” causes. Rather, all it means is that samesex marriage opponents have reminded us that marriage is a product or
fungible good that can be counterfeited—one whose exchange value is
determined by the law and whose form lends itself to daring imitative
possibilities. In this sense, counterfeiting rhetoric reveals the power of
its own transformative potential.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has considered the historical relationship between
unorthodox sexual/reproductive practices and counterfeiting in order to
suggest the following: just as counterfeiting rhetoric rests on the same
logic that shores up the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage
prohibitions, so, too, does the procreation rationale rest on the same
logic that shores up counterfeiting rhetoric. Understanding how the
counterfeiting analogy and the procreation rationale for same-sex
marriage prohibitions intersect with each other helps to explain what is
driving each. How can same-sex marriage opponents possibly
characterize same-sex marriage as counterfeit? Because same-sex
couples both engage in non-procreative sex and are having families
through artificial means that allow them to pass for the real thing.
Similarly, why has the procreation rationale been so successful in recent
same-sex marriage litigation if that rationale, in whichever form it has
assumed, is so logically flimsy? Because both homosexual sex and the
kind of families that same-sex couples quite literally ‘reproduce’ are
considered to be fraudulent ‘reproductions’ of the real thing—
reproductions which, in turn, attempt to pass for the real thing.
Earlier I suggested that we view the evolution of the
procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions through the
interpretive lens of Reva Siegel’s theory of “preservation-throughtransformation,” that is, the theory that status hierarchies are maintained,
in part, because the “justificatory rhetoric” that supports them evolves
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over time to assume a kinder, gentler tone.274 Commenting on Siegel’s
theory, Yoshino has remarked that “[p]reservation-throughtransformation does not foreclose the possibility of real social change.
Nor does it assume bad intent on the part of the individual legal actors.
It does, however, caution that progress narratives about status
hierarchies should be approached with intense skepticism.”275 This
Article has looked at the extent to which two such “progress
narratives”—the evolution of the procreation rationale for same-sex
marriage prohibitions and the rhetorical re-casting of gays and lesbians
as society’s counterfeiters rather than disgust-inducing outcasts—have
worked together to maintain a pre-existing status hierarchy based on
sexual orientation. Moreover, it has done so by turning to historical and
literary narratives about the interrelationship among counterfeiting, nonprocreative sex, and miscegenation—the latter of which represents a
fitting parallel to the fears surrounding marriage ‘mixing’ and ‘passing’
that have surfaced in the legal controversy over same-sex marriage. As
such, it has shown that historical and literary narratives provide us with
the tools by which to channel the “intense skepticism” that progress
narratives so often inspire and with which to challenge the rhetorical
tropes that have become such an integral part of the way in which we
justify certain status hierarchies that we barely even notice them.

274
275

Supra note ______, at ______.
Yoshino, supra note _____, at 825.

82

